Parenthood by Pure Intention: Assisted Reproduction and the Functional Approach to Parentage by Storrow, Richard F.
Hastings Law Journal
Volume 53 | Issue 3 Article 2
1-2002
Parenthood by Pure Intention: Assisted
Reproduction and the Functional Approach to
Parentage
Richard F. Storrow
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Richard F. Storrow, Parenthood by Pure Intention: Assisted Reproduction and the Functional Approach to Parentage, 53 Hastings L.J. 597
(2002).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol53/iss3/2
Parenthood By Pure Intention:
Assisted Reproduction and the




Assisted reproduction is widely used in this country and around
the world to help couples and single persons procreate where
procreation by sexual intercourse has failed or is not desired'
Assisted reproduction refers to methods of achieving pregnancy other
than coitus. Such methods include (1) intrauterine insemination; (2)
donation of eggs; (3) donation of embryos; (4) in-vitro fertilization
and transfer of embryos; and (5) intracytoplasmic sperm injection.2
New techniques are constantly being developed in this highly
unregulated area.' Unlike coitus, which can be a nonprocreative act,
assisted reproduction's sole aim is procreation, an activity highly
* Associate Professor, Texas Wesleyan University School of Law. J.D., Columbia
Law School, 1993; M.A., Columbia University, 1989; B.A., Miami University, 1987. I am
grateful to Carlos Ball, June Carbone and Susan Gary who provided valuable comments
on previous drafts. I thank Texas Wesleyan University for providing me with the research
support that made the preparation of this Article possible.
1. See LORI B. ANDREWS, THE CLONE AGE: ADVENTURES IN THE NEW WORLD
OF REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY 220 (1999) (reporting that the reproductive technology
industry, with an annual revenue of $2 billion, results in tens of thousands of births yearly)
[hereinafter ANDREWS, CLONE AGE].
2. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 102(4), 9B U.L.A. 303 (2001); RICHARD E. JONES,
HUMAN REPRODUCTIVE BIOLOGY 324 (2d ed. 1997); Murray L. Manus, The Proposed
Model Surrogate Parenthood Act: A Legislative Response to the Challenges of
Reproductive Technology, 29 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 671, 677-82 (1996). A detailed
discussion of the various alternative reproductive techniques is beyond the scope of this
Article.
3. See ANDREWS, CLONE AGE, supra note 1, at 219 ("This is truly the Wild West of
medicine.").
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valued in part "because it usually leads to child rearing."4 Despite the
constitutional protection of both procreation and child rearing under
family privacy doctrine,5 the law has not explicitly equated resort to
assisted reproduction 6 -perhaps because the use of assisted
reproduction challenges the traditional image of the marital couple
bearing children via sexual intercourse-with the image of the family
most favored by family privacy doctrine.8 Even though this model is
no longer the norm in society,9 the marital family model has assumed
4. JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 22 (1993) (emphasis added) [hereinafter ROBERTSON,
CHILDREN OF CHOICE].
5. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (procreation); Troxel v. Granville,
530 U.S. 57 (2000) (child rearing).
6 See Doe v. Kelly, 307 N.W.2d 438,441 (Mich Ct. App. 1981) (no consititutional
right to effectation of terms of surrogacy contract); accord In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227,
1253 (N.J. 1988) ("The right to procreate very simply is the right to have natural children,
whether through sexual intercourse or artificial insemination.").
7. See ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE, supra note 4, at 13 (1994) ("New
reproductive technologies are also often seen as a further cause of the disintegration and
breakdown of the nuclear family."); id. at 144; KATH WESTON, FAMILIES WE CHOOSE
169-70 (1997) ("In the United States, new reproductive technologies have collided with
ideologies that picture a child as the 'natural' product of a woman and a man in an act of
sexual intercourse."); Radhika Rao, Assisted Reproductive Technology and the Threat to
the Traditional Family, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 951,959 (1996); Helene S. Shapo, Matters of Life
and Death: Inheritance Consequences of Reproductive Technologies, 25 HOFSTRA L. REv.
1091, 1101 (1996) ("[R]eproductive technologies have ... been viewed as a threat to the
traditional family.").
8. See Richard F. Storrow, The Policy of Family Privacy: Uncovering the Bias in
Favor of Nuclear Families in American Constitutional La;v and Policy Reform, 66 MO. L.
REV. 527, 550, 582 (2001) (arguing that underlying constitutional family and individual
privacy doctrine is a bias in favor of traditional nuclear families).
9. See Jason Fields and Lynee M. Casper, America's Families and Living
Arrangements: March 2000, at 3 (2001) (reporting a drop in the percentage of married-
couple households with never married children under eighteen years of age from forty
percent of all households in 2000), available at http:llvww.census.gov/
prod/wwv/abs/popula.html#pop. This report also indicates a rise in the number of families
with their own children maintained by one parent, and a rise in the number of single
parents who never have been married. Id. at 7. Other census data reveals that 27.7
percent of children under eighteen live with one parent, 40.3 percent of those with
mothers who have never been married. See Terry A. Lugaila, U.S. Dep't of Commerce,
Current Population Reports, Marital Status and Living Arrangements: March 1988
(Update), at 1 (1988), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/www/abs/marital.html.
Indeed, within the mother-child family groups, 42.2 percent of mothers have never been
married, see Lynee M. Casper and Ken Bryson, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Current
Population Reports, Household and Family Characteristics: March 1988 (Update), at 1
(1998), available at http://www.census.gov/prodlwwwlabs/hh-fam.html, and within this
group, the majority of single mothers with children under six years of age have never been
married, see Ken Bryson and Lynne M. Casper, U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population
Reports, Household and Family Characteristics: March 1997, at 5 (1998), available at
http:llwww.census.gov/prod/3/98pubs/p20-509.pdf. See also Shapo, supra note 7, at 1101-
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an important role in shaping the law of parentage in assisted
reproduction cases. Despite what might be assumed a stabilizing
influence on this area of the law, parentage disputes arising from
assisted reproduction create confusion over what body of law should
control their outcome.' Whereas some courts have treated the
parentage issues that arise from the use of assisted reproduction as
best addressed through the application of adoption law, marital
presumptions of legitimacy or equitable estoppel," legislatures
addressing assisted reproduction have fashioned unique statutes to
resolve these issues, 2 suggesting that well-established parentage
principles do not adequately account for the policy ramifications of
the use of these techniques. Unfortunately, these judicial and
legislative efforts have done little to develop coherent and clear
criteria for the determination of parentage in this area and appear
even to be working somewhat at cross purposes. Despite this
confusion, what appears to underlie the judicial and legislative
responses made to date are policies that favor restriction instead of
expansion of the legal definition of the family. 3 The restrictive
policies advanced by these efforts promise to widen the divide
between the myriad forms of the family that exist in society today and
the ability of the law to protect the integrity of those families.'4
02 (describing traditional family as not one which is heavily represented among families
today and attributing changing demographics to increase in divorce, as well as to greater
social acceptance of cohabitation and single people raising children alone); D'Vera Cohn,
Census Shows Big Increase in Gay Households, WASH. POST, June 20, 2001, at Al
(describing census figures as showing "huge increases in the number of same-sex couples
sharing households"); Carey Goldberg, Single Dads Wage Revolution, One Bedtime Story
at a Time, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2001, at 1 (reporting that the the number of households
consisting of single fathers with primary custody of their children has risen about fifty
percent since 1990); Betsy Hammond, The 2000 Census; More Say "I Do" to Cohabitation,
PORTLAND OREGONIAN, June 6, 2001, at Al (reporting that nine percent of all couples
declared themselves "unmarried partners").
10. Janet L. Dolgin, Choice, Tradition, and the New Genetics: The Fragmentation of
the Ideology of Family, 32 CONN. L. REV. 523, 540 (2000) (noting that assisted
reproduction creates confusion about "the implications of biological parentage")
[hereinafter Dolgin, New Genetics].
11. See infra Table 1; see also infra notes 57-59, 74-77, 169, 193-203 and accompanying
text.
12. See infra Table 2; see also infra notes 145, 165-68, 171-92, 204-10, 294-301, 305-09
and accompanying text.
13. See ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE, supra note 7, at 145 (emphasizing that
collaborative reproduction's emphasis on enabling married couples to have and rear
biologic offspring supports the nuclear family); Rao, supra note 7, at 957 (commenting on
the fundamental conservatism of assisted reproductive technologies in replicating
traditional families).
14. See WESTON, supra note 7, at 6 ("In the United States the nuclear family
March 2002] PARENTHOOD BY PURE INTENTION
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The deployment of a narrow understanding of the family assisted
reproduction law has not been adequately addressed by
commentators, either because they believe well-established principles
of family law are sufficient to resolve the parentage issues arising
from assisted reproduction,15 or because they believe recognizing
assisted reproduction as a fundamental right will resolve these
issues. 6 Another group of commentators sees the recognition of
intentional parenthood by assisted reproduction jurisprudence and
specialized legislation (but not by traditional parentage principles) as
an antidote to laws marginalizing nontraditional families.17 None of
these approaches fully recognizes the potential for family law
reformers to harness emerging legal responses to assisted
reproduction to redefine the family to reflect more faithfully how
families are constituted today.'Y The notion of intentional
parenthood, like the best interests of the child standard, is as yet too
lacking in substance to expect coherent decisionmaking to emerge
from its application. As has often happened with the open-ended,
elastic best interests of the child standard, the hope that courts will
use the concept of intention to make unbiased decisions about the
represents a privileged construct, rather than one among a number of family forms
accorded equivalent status.").
15. See Marsha Garrison, Law Making for Baby Making: An Interpretive Approach to
the Determination of Legal Parentage, 113 HARV. L. REv. 835, 882 (2000) [hereinafter
Garrison, Interpretive Approach].
16. See, e.g., ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE, supra note 4, at 4,16.
17. See, e.g., Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-based
Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 297; John
Lawrence Hill, What Does It Mean To Be a "Parent"? The Claims of Biology as the Basis
for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353 (1991).
Scholars use the term "nontraditional families" or "alternative families" to denote
families whose basis is not a marital unit. See, e.g., IRA MARK ELLMAN, ET AL., FAMILY
LAW: CASES, TEXT, PROBLEMS 929 (3d ed. 1998) ("nontraditional families"); D. KELLY
WEISBERG & SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 397 (1998) ("alternative families"). Professor Martha Fineman has coined
the term "intimate entities" to refer to "family-like groups that do not conform to the
traditional model." See Martha Albertson Fineman, Our Sacred Institution: The Ideal of
the Family in American Law and Society, 1993 UTAH L. REv. 387,389 n.8. Professor Elvia
Arriola objects to the term "nontraditional" as applied in this context because it creates
the impression that the family in question is illegitimate. See Elvia R. Arriola, Law and
the Family of Choice and Need, 35 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 691,694 (1997).
18. See MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES: THE TROUBLE WITH
TRADE IN SEX, CHILDREN, BODY PARTS, AND OTHER THINGS 150 (1996) (remarking
that surrogacy may be capable of transforming the family); R. Alta Charo, And Baby
Makes Three-or Four, or Five, or Six: Redefining the Family after the Reprotech
Revolution, 15 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 231, 242 (2000) (remarking that the
compartmentalization of reproduction through technology offers an "opportunity to re-
examine" assumptions about the family).
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status of families leaves too much to chance. In addition, recognizing
that access to assisted reproduction is a constitutionally protected
individual liberty bears no relationship to whether the families
created via exercises of this freedom will be recognized as such. 9
Traditional family law principles do not neatly resolve all parentage
questions arising from assisted reproduction. The policies underlying
these traditional principles, however, can be satisfactorily met even
under a legal regime recognizing parentage by pure intention.
This Article discusses how the emerging law of assisted
reproduction is capable of reshaping the legal definition of the family.
Part I describes the models of the family deployed by jurisprudence
and legislation governing parentage claims arising from surrogacy
arrangements and artificial insemination. Concerning maternity,
courts have yet to cope successfully with the fragmentation of
maternity by surrogacy and have issued decisions inspiring more
speculation than certainty. Moreover, very few contests between
genetic, gestational and intending mothers have been resolved in the
courts, leaving gaps in the law that render unclear the outcome of
potential future disputes. The law is more complete with regard to
paternity issues in artificial insemination cases, but different
treatment of sperm donors and progenitors who sire children through
coitus has raised important concerns. Nonetheless, this differential
treatment is reflective of the need for the law to recognize that these
carefully planned families that are not accounted for by the parentage
rules of the past.
More important for the purposes of this Article, surrogacy and
artificial insemination law provide fertile ground for a redefinition of
the family. Although the fundamental indeterminacy of both
maternity and paternity in assisted reproduction law is cause for
concern among individuals hoping to employ this technology, it at the
same time provides a unexpected basis for a new vision of the family.
Part II articulates this new wisdom by, first, canvassing and
synthesizing scholarly and legislative treatment of the concept of
intentional parenthood and, second, challenging reservation of the
privilege of intentional parenthood, under existing and proposed
legislation, to married couples. Concluding that the role of marriage
under such statutes is largely to secure support claims of children
19. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989); In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227,
1253-54 (N.J. 1988); Garrison, Interpretive Approach, supra note 15, at 857, 920; Storrow,
supra note 8 at 549 n.170 (pointing out state-sanctioned incursions into the parental
autonomy of unwed parents).
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born through assisted reproduction to the resources of identifiable
private parties, this Part demonstrates how marriage is superfluous
for this purpose. In order to bolster the claim of unmarried
individuals to the privilege of parenthood by pure intention, Part II
further argues that the law should understand intentional parenthood
as subsumed by the notion of functional parenthood and discusses
recent case law that supports this understanding. These arguments
demonstrate that the privilege of intentional parenthood should be
extended, as a matter of sound family law policy, to the unmarried.
In this way, the law of assisted reproduction itself can contribute to a
broad program of family redefinition that pays heed to the needs and
realities of contemporary family life.
I. Assisted Reproduction and Parentage
The fragmentation of parentage by assisted reproduction creates
the possibility that a child conceived by this means could have as
many as eight parents: the egg donor, the sperm donor, their spouses,
the surrogate and her husband, and the intending mother and father.0
Although some courts have allowed a child simultaneously to have
three parents,2' as a rule the law does not simultaneously recognize
more than two individuals as the parents of an individual child.'
Faced with making a choice from among these various contenders,
20. See Naomi Calm, Children's Interests and Information Disclosure: Who Provided
the Egg and Sperm? Or Mommy, Where (and Whom) Do I Come From?, 2 GEO. J.
GENDER & L. 1, 1 (2000); Janet L. Dolgin, An Emerging Consensus: Reproductive
Technology and the Law, 23 VT. L. REV. 225, 236, 245 n.135 (1998) [hereinafter Dolgin,
Emerging Consensus]; cf Hill, supra note 17, at 355 ("We now live in an era where a child
may have as many as five different 'parents.' These include a sperm donor, an egg donor,
a surrogate or gestational host, and two nonbiologically related individuals who intend to
raise the child.").
21. Kate Kendell, Director of the National Center for Lesbian Rights, reports that
"several third-parent adoptions have been granted by trial courts here in the Bay Area."
Letter from Kate Kendell (Feb. 6,2001) (on file with author). Some scholars advocate for
an even more expanded definition of parentage. See, e.g., Charo, supra note 18, at 234,
252-53 (advocating simultaneous recognition of genetic, gestational, and intentional
parents).
22. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d. 776, 781 (Cal. 1993) ("[For any child California
law recognizes only one natural mother..."); CARL E. SCHNEIDER & MARGARET F.
BRINIG, AN INVITATION TO FAMILY LAW: PRINCIPLES, PROCESS AND PERSPECTIVES
926 (1995); Katharine Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need
for Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV.
879, 882 (1984) ("[A] stepfather and a natural father cannot simultaneously have a legal
parenting relationship with a child; one must have all parental rights and duties and the
other may have none.").
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courts have called for more legislative guidance.3 In response, some
legislatures have promulgated guidelines for determining legal
parentage in assisted reproduction cases.24 Most have not, however,
leaving courts to reach determinations based on existing parentage
precedents and on parallels drawn to artificial insemination
legislation. As the following discussion reveals, the outcomes of these
disputes have been undeniably awkward and betray an indeterminacy
of parentage in assisted reproduction cases that has yet to be fully
addressed.
A. Maternity
The treatment of maternity in assisted reproduction law is a
product of the struggle to designate one legal mother from among
three possible contenders for motherhood. This struggle is best seen
in the law of surrogacy, governing arrangements where a woman
contracts to become pregnant by means of assisted reproduction with
or without the use of an egg from her own body.' Whether or not the
23. See Buzzanca v. Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 293 (Ct. App. 1998) ("Again we
must call on the Legislature to sort out the parental rights and responsibilities of those
involved in artificial reproduction."); In re Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893, 903 n.24 (Ct.
App. 1994) (citing Katherine B. Lieber, Note, Selling the Womb: Can the Feminist
Critique of Surrogacy Be Answered? 68 IND. LJ. 205, 210 (1992)); In re adoption of
Matthew B., 284 Cal. Rptr. 18, 37 (Ct. App. 1991) ("[W]e urge the Legislature to [act]
expeditiously."); Belsito v. Clark, 67 Ohio Misc.2d 54, 65 n.3 (1994) ("[fIt would be
beneficial to the law of surrogacy for the legislature to act and end this uncertainty.");
JANET L. DOLGIN, DEFINING THE FAMILY: LAW, TECHNOLOGY, AND REPRODUCTION
IN AN UNEASY AGE 62 (1997) [hereinafter DOLGIN, DEFINING THE FAMILY]; see also
Garrison, Interpretive Approach, supra note 15, at 877 (describing legislation as
"preferable to continued case-by-case adjudication"); Marsha Garrison, The Technological
Family, What's New and What's Not, 33 FAM. L.Q. 691, 700 (1999) [hereinafter Garrison,
Technological Family].
24. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201 (1998) (determining parentage of children
born to surrogate mothers); FLA. STAT. ch. 63.212(1)(i)2 (articulating requirements for
"preplanned adoption arrangement"), 742.15 (West 1997) (articulating requirements for
gestational surrogacy contracts); N.H. REv. STAT. § 168-B:23 (1994) (detailing effect of a
judicial order validating surrogacy arrangement); KY. REV. STAT. § 199.590 (Michie 1998)
(declaring surrogacy contracts void); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.861 (West 1997)
(declaring "surrogate parentage contract" void and unenforceable); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW
§ 123 (McKinney 1999) (outlawing payment in connection with surrogate parenting
contract); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-05 (1997) (declaring surrogate agreements void);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-204 (Michie 1995) (prohibiting surrogate parenthood
agreements); WIS. STAT. § 69.14(1)(h) (West 1999) (prescribing registration of birth
certificates of children born to a surrogate mother); MONTGOMERY CTY. (OHIO) COMM.
PLEAS PROB. Loc. R. 83.1 (requiring pre-approval of all surrogate adoption contracts).
25. See N.H. REV. STAT. § 168-B:1(XII) (1997) ("'Surrogacy'... means any
arrangement by which a woman agrees to be impregnated using either the intended
father's sperm, the intended mother's egg or their preembryo ... ").
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surrogate employs her own egg determines the type of surrogacy
employed. Where she does, the surrogacy is known as traditional.26
Where she does not, the surrogacy is known as gestational.' As
indicated below, in Table 1, surrogacy divides maternity into three
components-gestational, genetic and intentional.' In traditional
surrogacy cases, the gestational and genetic components of
motherhood are embodied in one woman, and the intentional
component resides in a second. In gestational surrogacy cases, each
of these indicia of motherhood can be held by a different woman,
with the surrogate embodying the gestational function and the
intending mother or a donor providing the genetic contribution.'
Thus, depending on what type of surrogacy is employed, the
components of motherhood will be found in as few as two and as
many as three women. Given that the law will recognize only one
mother at the birth of each individual child,' at least until there has
been an adoption of the child,3 identifying the legal mother in
gestational surrogacy cases sometimes gives rise to legal disputes.
26. See In re Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893, 894 (Ct. App. 1994) ("By 'traditional'
surrogacy we mean an arrangement where a woman is impregnated with the sperm of a
married man with the prior understanding that the resulting child is to be legally the child
of the married man and his infertile wife."); R.R. v. M.H., 689 N.E.2d 790, 795 (Mass.
1998) (defining traditional surrogacy as an arrangement "in which the fertile member of
an infertile couple is one of the child's biological parents"); Shoshana L. Gillers, Note, A
Labor Theory of Legal Parenthood, 110 YALE L.J. 691, 697,702 (2001).
27. See R.R., 689 N.E.2d at 795 n.10 (Mass. 1998) (citing Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d
776,784 (Cal. 1993)); A.H.W. v. G.H.B., 772 A.2d 948, 950 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2000); Gillers,
supra note 26, at 697-98. But see Jaycee B. v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 694, 695
(Ct. App. 1996); Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr.2d at 894 (defining gestational surrogacy as when
a husband's sperm "is artificially united with the egg of his wife" to create an embryo for
implantation in a surrogate who carries the child to term).
28. See Ilana Hurwitz, Collaborative Reproduction: Finding the Child in the Maze of
Legal Motherhood, 33 CONN. L. REv. 127, 128 (2000); Anne Reichman Schiff, Solomonic
Decisions in Egg Donation: Unscrambling the Conundrum of Legal Maternity, 80 IOWVA L.
REV. 265,273 (1995).
29. See Charo, supra note 17, at 232 (commenting that gestational surrogacy calls into
question the importance of genetics to legal maternity).
30. See Janet L. Dolgin, Just a Gene: Judicial Assumptions About Parenthood, 40
UCLA L. REV. 637 (1993). But see In re C.C., No. A 19833, slip op. (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept.
12, 1997) (recognizing the simultaneous maternity of both the genetic and the gestation
mothers).
31. See, e.g., In re M.M.D., 662 A.2d 837,862 (D.C. 1995) (finding no legal impediment
to adoption of children by biological parents' same-sex partners); In re Tammy, 619
N.E.2d 315,321 (Mass. 1993) (approving adoption of child by biological mother's same-sex
partner); In re H.N.R., 666 A.2d 535, 541 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995) (same); In re
Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397, 405 (N.Y. 1995) (declaring adoption statute not to be a "sword to
prohibit otherwise beneficial intrafamily adoptions by second parents," whether of the
same or the opposite sex as the biological parent); In re B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271, 1276 (Vt.
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Professor Janet Dolgin, well known for her scholarship on
family law, finds surrogacy jurisprudence consistent with the thesis
she has been developing for many years that the law is beginning to
"reflect demographic and ideological changes that have been altering
the scope and meaning of family for decades. 32 Dolgin argues that
judicial responses to surrogacy disputes, in seeking to resolve the
various claims to maternity they present, 3 reflect a willingness to
revise the model of the traditional marital family to make it more
malleable and complex.' This is not to say, Dolgin cautions, that the
traditional family has been abandoned in surrogacy cases, but simply
that it has been augmented to reflect judicial recognition of the
evolution of the family from the family of biogenic unity to the family
of choice.35 Dolgin believes this development is a valuable template
for much needed legislation in the surrogacy arena. 6 As evidence for
her conclusion, Dolgin harmonizes a set of seemingly contradictory
assisted reproduction cases from 1998, Buzzanca v. Buzzanca z7 R.R.
v. M.H.3 and Kass v. Kass.
Buzzanca and R.R. explore the determination of maternity in
assisted reproduction cases and have Johnson v. Calvert "o and In re
Moschettad" as their antecedents. Johnson was a case in which Anna
Johnson, pursuant to a contract, agreed to gestate an embryo created
using the gametes of married couple Mark and Crispina Calvert.2
Upon reaching the seventh month of her pregnancy, Johnson
demanded full payment for her services and threatened to keep the
child . In response, the Calverts, followed by Johnson, sued to
establish their rights to the child.'" At trial, the court declared the
Calverts the parents of the child, given their genetic relationship,
enforced the surrogacy contract, and terminated the visitation rights
Johnson had been granted pending the outcome of the trial.45
1993) (approving adoption of child by biological mother's same-sex partner).
32. DOLGIN, DEFINING THE FAMILY, supra note 23, at 34.
33. See Dolgin, Emerging Consensus, supra note 20, at 226, 233.
34. See id. at 226.
35. See id. at 226, 228-29.
36. See iL at 228.
37. 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Ct. App. 1998).
38. 689 N.E.2d 790 (Mass. 1998).
39. 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998).
40. 851 P.2d 776 (1993).
41. 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893 (Ct. App. 1994).





Johnson appealed, first to the California Court of Appeals and
then to the California Supreme Court, both of which affirmed the
trial court's ruling. The supreme court asserted that either a genetic
contribution or a gestational contribution could support a declaration
of maternity under California law46 and could find no legislative
preference for either one.47 Faced with two viable claims to
maternity, the court, with the aid of scholarly opinion, 4 decided to
render intention, as manifested in the surrogacy agreement, the
dispositive factor.49 Absent the Calverts' intent, declared the court,
the child would never have existed." Under this analysis, Johnson
became a mere facilitator of the Calverts' intent; any intention she
had had in asserting parentage was subordinate to theirs, it being
clear that had she asserted these same intentions before entering into
the agreement, the Calverts would most assuredly have withdrawn
from the project.i
The lone dissenting justice in Johnson was of the view that
gestation, while not decisive, was nonetheless a more significant
factor than the majority was willing to admit. 2 In particular, the
dissent, believing it inappropriate to analyze a family law dispute with
concepts borrowed from tort law, property law and contract law, 3 was
concerned that this substantial contribution to procreation was
devaluede4 by the court's analysis.5 Instead, the dissent advocated
applying, in the absence of clear legislative guidance, a best interests
of the child standard to resolve maternity disputes in gestational
surrogacy cases.'
46. See id. at 780 (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 7003(1)).
47. See id. at 781.
48. See id. at 782-83 (citing Hill, supra note 17; Shultz, supra note 17; Andrea E.
Stumpf, Note, Redefining Mother: A Legal Matrix for New Reproductive Technologies, 96
YALE L.J. 187, 197-202 (1986)).
49. See id. at 781 n.10 ("[S]he who intended to bring about the birth of a child that she
intended to raise as her own - - is the natural mother under California law.").
50. See id. at 782. This point was likewise made in In re Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 893,
903 (Ct. App. 1994), discussed infra, wherein the court nonetheless recognized the legal
motherhood of a traditional surrogate.
51. See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782.
52. See id. at 795, 797-98 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
53. See id. at 795-97 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
54. See id. at 797 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
55. See id. at 795 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
56. See id. at 799, 801 (Kennard, J., dissenting); see also Hurwitz, supra note 28, at 169-
79 (arguing that a best interests of the child standard should drive the determination of
legal maternity in surrogacy cases). Responding, the Johnson majority opined that even if
the best interests of the child were to be the applicable standard, Johnson arguably had
shown they were not with her since she had agreed not to assert maternity in the first
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The next year the California Court of Appeals decided
Moschetta, in which another surrogate mother changed her mind
during her pregnancy and decided to assert parental rights in conflict
with the terms of the agreement." In contrast to Johnson, though,
Moschetta involved traditional surrogacy. Finding no doubt as to the
identity of the biological mother in such cases, in short, "no 'tie' to
break,"' s the Court declined to enforce the surrogacy contract,
deeming it incompatible with parentage and adoption principles.59
With Johnson and Moschetta as its backdrop, the California
Court of Appeals, in Buzzanca, again scrutinized parentage in the
context of gestational surrogacy. In that case, married couple Luanne
and John Buzzanca contracted with a surrogate to gestate an embryo
they had acquired but to which neither had contributed genetic
material.6 The couple separated, and Luanne petitioned to be named
baby Jaycee's mother.6  The identities of the genetic contributors
were not known,62 and the surrogate made no claim to Jaycee. 63
Because of the absence of either genetic or gestational ties between
either John, Luanne, the surrogate or her husband and Jaycee, the
trial court ruled that she had no parent64 The appellate court,
reversing, ruled that Luanne was Jaycee's mother, since the surrogate
gave birth to her on Luanne's behalf.6' Although the court found
Johnson instructive, it could not find it dispositive, since in Buzzanca
there was no tie for motherhood and thus no reason to use intention
to break it.' Instead, the court found statutory authority for an
intentional mother's claim to legal motherhood in California's statute
governing the parentage ramifications of artificial insemination. 7 The
statute, based on a provision of the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA),
provides that a husband who consents to the artificial insemination of
his wife is the father of the resulting child s The sperm donor in such
instance. See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782 n.10.
57. See In re Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893, 895 (Ct. App. 1994).
58. L at 896.
59. See idi at 894-95.
60. See Buzzanca v. Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280,282,283 (Ct. App. 1998).
61. See iL at 282.
62. See id. at 284.
63. See id. at 282.
64. See id at 282-83. But see Shultz, supra note 17, at 330 ("Social policy demands that
someone be committed to rearing any child brought into the world.").
65. See Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 282.
66. See itt at 288.
67. See i&. at 286-88.
68. See i&. at 285 & n.6.
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a case has no legal claim to paternity.69 The court saw a clear parallel
between a husband in such a case and Luanne Buzzanca: like a
husband who consents to his wife's artificial insemination, Luanne
arranged for a medical procedure to be performed on the surrogate
that resulted in her pregnancy and the eventual birth of a child.7" In
essence, Luanne's intentional act determined her legal motherhood
just as a husband's act of consenting to artificial insemination of his
wife determines his legal fatherhood.7 Compelled resort to adoption
law in this context, the court found, would be "an exercise in circular
reasoning, because it assumes the idea that it seeks to prove; namely,
that a child who is born as the result of artificial reproduction is
somebody else's child from the beginning."' The court described this
view of intentional parenthood as applicable "to any situation where
a child would not have been born but for the efforts of the intended
parents.,
73
R.R. was a traditional surrogacy case and was thus more like
Moschetta than like either Johnson or Buzzanca. In R.R., a husband
and his wife entered into a contract with a surrogate who agreed to be
impregnated with the husband's sperm and to surrender custody of
the child to him and his wife in exchange for $10,000.74 In the sixth
month of her pregnancy, the surrogate decided she wanted to keep
the child she was carrying.75 In response to the husband's lawsuit, the
trial court ordered the surrogate to surrender custody of the child to
the husband after it was born and allowed her frequent visitation.76
The trial court referred the question of the enforceability of the
surrogacy contract to the appellate courts.77
Distinguishing traditional from gestational surrogacy,78 the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts refused to apply the
artificial insemination statute because a literal application of it would
have rendered the surrogate's husband the legal father of the child, a
69. See id. at 285 n.7; see also infra notes 171-73, 181 and accompanying text.
70. Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 288. In Johnson, Anna Johnson raised the artificial
insemination statute, claiming Mark and Crispina Calvert were mere donors and thus
could claim no legal parentage under the explicit terms of the statute. See Johnson v.
Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 787 (Cal. 1993). The court could find no evidence in the record
supporting the conclusion that the Calverts intended to donate their gametes. See id.
71. See Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 288.
72. Id. at 291.
73. See iL at 290 (internal quotation marks omitted).
74. See R.R. v. M.H., 689 N.E.2d 790,792 (Mass. 1998).
75. See id. at 791.
76. See id. at 793.
77. See id.
78. See id. at 795 n.10.
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result the legislature could not have intended. 9 The court found the
comparison between surrogate mothers and sperm donors
uncompelling, "because surrogate motherhood is never anonymous
and her commitment and contribution is unavoidably much greater
than that of a sperm donor." s The court concluded that the artificial
insemination statute was not meant to apply to children born of a
married surrogate mother but was meant to apply only to a fertile
mother whose infertile husband had consented to her artificial
insemination.8' In this way, the court suggested the analogy between
surrogacy and artificial insemination was inappropriate in both
traditional and gestational surrogacy cases.
Dolgin explains the different outcomes of these cases as the
product of the differences between traditional surrogacy and
gestational surrogacy.! She sees R.R., on the one hand, as a case
reflecting the opinion of several courts "that the biological mother is
the natural, and thus, the legal mother, in cases of traditional
surrogacy ' and that an adoption is required for the intending mother
to have her maternity legally recognized.' In traditional surrogacy
cases, courts allow the intending parents to adopt the child according
to basic principles of adoption law. The agreement of the parties is
thus not enforced per se, but the intention of the parties, as reflected
in these documents, can nonetheless be effectuated through adoption.
At no time is the intending mother in a traditional surrogacy
arrangement considered the natural mother of the child at the
moment of the child's birth." Dolgin sees Buzzanca, on the other
hand, as a case in which the court extended intentional parentage
79. See id. at 795 ("It is doubtful ... that the Legislature intended § 4B to apply to the
child of a married surrogate mother.").
80. Id. at 795.
81. See id. at 795-96; cf In re adoption of Matthew B., 284 Cal. Rptr. 18 (Cal. Ct. App.
1991) (rejection of artificial insemination-surrogacy analogy on procedural grounds).
82. See Dolgin, Emerging Consensus, supra note 20, at 257 ("[I]t is reasonable to
conclude that the differences between R.R. and Buzzanca reflect differences in the fact
patterns, in particular in the technology employed in the two cases, rather than differences
in the basic perspectives of the deciding courts.").
83. Id. at 254. Accord, Charo, supra note 18, at 248.
84. Dolgin, Emerging Consensus, supra note 20, at 254. Accord, Garrison,
Technological Family, supra note 23, at 696; Garrison, Interpretive Approach, supra note
15, at 898.
85. See R.R., 689 N.E.2d at 797 ("We simply decline, on public policy grounds, to
apply to a surrogacy agreement of the type involved here the general principle that an
agreement between informed, mature adults should be enforced absent proof of duress,
fraud, or undue influence.").
86. See Dolgin, Emerging Consensus, supra note 20, at 254.
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beyond the parameters set by Johnson to recognize, without the
necessity of an adoption, the parentage of a couple biologically
unrelated to the child.' She argues that, in gestational surrogacy
cases, courts feel freer to reject an adoption default model than they
do in traditional surrogacy cases where genetics and gestation are
joined. Without this joining, courts can more freely grant legal weight
to intention. Thus, Dolgin sees Johnson as a case in which "the
identification and definition of mother.., become matters of
negotiable choice"" and Buzzanca as a case in which consent grounds
parentage.89 These characterizations lead her to conclude that the fact
that the surrogate in Buzzanca did not assert her parentage was "less
crucial" to the outcome of that case than was the fact that Luanne
Buzzanca "[had] consented to the conception and birth of baby
Jaycee."" In sum, while courts in traditional surrogacy cases consider
the surrogate to be the natural mother, thus necessitating compliance
with adoption law for the contract to be fully performed, courts in
gestational surrogacy cases, faced with greater uncertainty about the
child's natural parents, are more willing to apply an intentional-
parent analysis.91 Dolgin thus sees two paradigms at work, a
biological-parentage paradigm in traditional surrogacy cases and a
presumptive-parentage paradigm in gestational surrogacy cases. This
framework, she argues, allows for parentage to be determined
completely apart from biological facts' and can serve as the
foundation for "a broad theory of familial relationships"' that will
permit policymakers to formulate "a more complicated and more
malleable ideological conception of the family than existed even a few
decades ago."'94
The hope that the law will someday recognize nontraditional
families as families has given rise to a large body of scholarship
impressive for its depth of analysis and for its vision of a more just
and inclusive society.9 Dolgin's thesis is consistent with this vision
87. See id. at 274. Accord, Jonathan B. Pitt, Fragmenting Procreation, 108 YALE L.J.
1893, 1896 (1999) (citations omitted).
88. DOLGIN, DEFINING THE FAMILY, supra, note 23, at 194.
89. See Dolgin, Emerging Consensus, supra, note 20, at 249.
90. Id. at 246-47.
91. See id. at 258.
92. See id. at 259.
93. See id. at 227.
94. See id. at 226 (footnote omitted).
95. See Note, Looking for a Family Resemblance: the Limits of the Functional
Approach to the Legal Definition of Family, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1640, 1650 n.64 (1991)
(citing supporters of a functional approach to family definition) [hereinafter Family
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because it offers hope that courts and legislatures will eventually
recognize the status of nontraditional families as equivalent to that of
marital families. 6 This kind of revolutionary change, if it is in fact
occurring in the area of assisted reproduction, will be gradual and will
be susceptible to undermining by the backpedaling of policymakers, a
phenomenon evident in other areas of the law.' Due to the paucity
Resemblance]. See, e.g., Carlos A. Bass and Janice Farrell Pen, Warring with Wardale:
Morality, Social Science, and Gay and Lesbian Parents, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 253, 261-72;
Kristine L. Burks, Redefining Parenthood: Child Custody and Visitation When
Nontraditional Families Dissolve, 24 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 223 (1994); Leslie Joan
Harris, Reconsidering the Criteria for Legal Fatherhood, 1996 Utah L. Rev. 461, 480
("Functioning as a parent should be the basis for parental rights and duties because this
criterion is most congruent with current mores and because it would encourage and
support people who do take responsibility for children."); Gilbert A. Holmes, The Tie
That Binds: The Constitutional Right of Children to Maintain Relationships with Parent-
like Individuals, 53 MD. L. REV. 358, 392-94 (1994) (proposing a child-centered approach
to parentage that would recognize parent-like individuals); Gerald Korngold, Single
Family Use Covenants: For Achieving a Balance Between Traditional Family Life and
IndividualAutonomy, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 951 (1989); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, It
All Depends on What You Mean by "Home" Toward a Communitarian Theory of The
"Nontraditional" Family, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 569; Tsippi Wray, Lesbian Relationships and
Parenthood: Models for Legal Recognition of Nontraditional Families, 21 HAMLINE L.
REV. 127 (1997); Craig A. Bowman & Blake M. Cornish, Note, A More Perfect Union: A
Legal and Social Analysis of Domestic Partnership Ordinances, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1164
(1992); James D. Esseks, Recent Development, Redefining The Family-Braschi v. Stahl
Associates 74 N.Y.2D 201, 543 N.E.2D 49, 544 N.YS.2D 784 (1989), 25 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. Rev. 183 (1990); Marissa J. Holob, Note, Respecting Commitment: A Proposal to
Prevent Legal Barriers From Obstructing the Effectuation of Intestate Goals, 85 CORNELL
L. REV. 1492 (2000); Kirsten Korn, Comment, The Struggle for the Child: Preserving the
Family in Adoption Disputes Between Biological Parents and Third Parties, 72 N.C. L.
REV. 1279 (1994); Note, Another Mother?: The Courts' Denial of Legal Status to The Non-
Biological Parent upon Dissolution of Lesbian Families, 31 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 981
(1992).
96. See Dolgin, New Genetics, supra note 10, at 540 (stating that reproductive
technology compels courts "to seek alternative visions of the parent-child relationship as
well as of relationships among adults within families.").
97. In an area of the law even more resistant to change than the legal definition of the
family-the legal definition of sex-the idea that one's sex is determined not by
chromosomes but by other factors appears to be emerging as a consensus in American and
other common law courts. See, e.g., Rosa v. Park West Bank & Trust Co., 214 F.3d 213
(1st Cir. 2000) (successful Equal Credit Opportunity Act action); Schwenk v. Hartford,
204 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000) (successful action under Gender Motivated Violence Act,
federal civil remedies provision of which was nullified in United States v. Morrison, 529
U.S. 598, 627 (2000)); Miles v. New York Univ., 979 F. Supp. 248 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(successful Title IX action); Vecchione v. Vecchione, Civ. No. 96D003769 (Cal. Super. Ct.
1997), reported in L.A. DAILY J., Nov. 26, 1997, at 1; In re Gardiner, 22 P.3d 1086 (Kan.
Ct. App. 2001); M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976) (marriage of
post-operative transsexual valid); M. v. M. (unreported) 30 May 1991, S. Ct. N.Z. This
consensus has suffered setbacks in recent cases. See, e.g., Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d
223, 230 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999) (following reasoning of 1970 English decision holding sex to
be determined by chromosomes); Bellinger v. Bellinger, 3 F.C.R. 733 (2000) (same).
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of assisted reproduction cases to date,93 Dolgin's thesis warrants
evaluating both on its own terms and in light of more recent
developments. Regardless of the soundness of her thesis in the
abstract, however, a substantive demonstration that assisted
reproduction is capable of inspiring the law to grant equal legal status
to nontraditional families is needed.Y
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98. See In re Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893, 898 n.13 (Ct. App. 1994) ("Surrogacy is
one of those subjects where the law review articles easily outnumber the published
decisions.").
99. See Part II, infra (providing a substantive demonstration of how assisted






HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 53
PARENTHOOD BY PURE INTENTION
A critical component of Dolgin's emerging-consensus thesis is
the application of the spirit of artificial insemination provisions to
gestational surrogacy arrangements. The justification for this
application is that a wife's intent to raise a child gestated by a
surrogate is comparable to the consent of a husband to be the father
of a child gestated by his wife. This analogy breaks down when the
surrogacy employed is traditional rather than gestational.' ° As R.R.
noted, applying the artificial insemination statute in a traditional
surrogacy case can lead to unintended parentage determinations.0 ' If
the surrogate is married, her husband is the legal father of the child,
since he consented to her artificial insemination. If she is not
married, under some artificial insemination statutes, she is the sole
parent, since the donor of semen who is not her husband has no claim
to parentage." z Thus, artificial insemination legislation cannot be
used to achieve the results intended in traditional surrogacy
arrangements.
Upon further examination, though, it would appear that artificial
insemination legislation is no more applicable to gestational
surrogacy than it is to traditional surrogacy. The type of assisted
reproduction most like artificial insemination is, of course, egg
donation, where a wife consents to the combination of her husband's
sperm with the egg of another woman and gestates the resulting
embryo.' 3 This certainly sounds related to surrogacy, with the
exception that both egg donation and artificial insemination, unlike
surrogacy, do not contemplate gestation by anyone other than the
wife and so "should not be confused with parental surrogacy."""
100. See In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227, 1254 (N.J. 1988) (describing artificial
insemination to be unlike traditional surrogacy).
101. See R.R. v. M.H., 689 N.E.2d 790,795 (Mass. 1998).
102. See infra notes 175, 187-89 and accompanying text.
103. See, e.g., McDonald v. McDonald, 608 N.Y.S.2d 477, 478 (App. Div. 1994). In
McDonald, when a husband attempted to argue that his wife, who had submitted to egg
donation, was not the legal mother of the resulting child because she had no genetic
relationship to the child, a New York court rejected the position that a wife's gestation of
a fetus by egg donation was insufficient to render her the mother of the child. See id. at
480. See also In re Baby M., 537 A.2d at 1254-55 (noting intending mother's claim would
have been stronger had the case been one of egg donation).
104. JOHN J. SAMPSON & HARRY L. TINDALL ET AL., SAMPSON & TINDALL'S TEXAS
FAMILY CODE ANNOTATED §§ 151.102-.103 cmt. (1998). Texas's former egg donation
statute explicitly stated the requirement that the donated egg would be "placed in [the
-wife's] uterus." TEx. FAM. CODE § 151.102 (Vernon 1996) (repealed). Similarly, embryo
donation statutes contemplate gestation by the intending mother, although neither spouse
contributes genetic material. See, e.g., TEx. FAM. CODE § 151.103 (Vernon 1996)
(repealed). These Texas statutes have been superseded by enactment of the Uniform
Parentage Act in Texas. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 160.707 (Vernon 2001); JOHN J.
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Indeed, even the Johnson court, which struggled to break the tie
between genetic and gestational mothers in a gestational surrogacy
case, made the clear statement that in an egg donation situation the
gestational mother is the natural mother of the child." Thus, there is
no reason to distinguish between husband and wife under artificial
insemination and ovum donation statutes, since both types of statutes
allow one party to the marriage to consent to the combination of
genetic material contributed by a third party with the genetic material
of the other spouse and are arguably dependent upon this factor. In a
case like Buzzanca, however, neither the husband nor the wife
contributes genetic material, the wife does not gestate the embryo,
and so, arguably, any resort to artificial insemination or egg donation
provisions seems misguided."' Since both traditional and gestational
surrogacy contemplate gestation by someone other than the wife, the
appeal to artificial insemination is weak, unless on some level
gestation truly plays less of a role in determining parentage under
artificial insemination and egg donation statutes than the statutes
themselves suggest.
The very history of the determination of parentage belies the
notion that gestation is inessential enough to the determination of
maternity that the law of assisted reproduction should make it give
way to intention. The UPA itself embodies the age-old wisdom that a
woman who gives birth to a child is presumed the mother of that
child." The Act admittedly creates an exception to this rule for both
traditional and gestational surrogacy, but it sounds the caveat that in
cases of traditional surrogacy
[t]he practice of having a woman perform both functions is
generally strongly disfavored by the assisted reproduction
community. Experience has shown that the gestational mother's
genetic link to the child sometimes creates additional emotional
and psychological problems in enforcing a gestational agreement.'
0 3
The UPA's warning suggests that by severing the genetic and
gestational functions of motherhood, intention will prevail over
gestational motherhood as it did in Johnson and Buzzanca. Like
SAMPSON & HARRY L. TINDALL ET AL., SAMPSON & TINDALL'S TExAS FAMILY CODE
ANNOTATED § 460 (2001) (exlaining that the superseding statutes carry "[t]he same basic
legal effect" "formerly found in Chapter 15.").
105. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776,782 (Cal. 1993).
106. See Pitt, supra note 87, at 1898 (noting lack of light shed by artificial insemination
statute on question of whether legislature deems intent or gestation primary in parentage
determination).
107. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACr § 201(a)(1), 9B U.L.A. 309 (2001).
108. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACr art. 8 cmt., 9B U.L.A. 361 (2001).
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Dolgin, who believes the surrogate's failure to raise a maternity claim
in Buzzanca was not the dominant factor in that case's outcome,"0
this caveat underestimates the importance of gestation in the
determination of legal motherhood. The importance of gestation is
salient in both paternity and abortion rights jurisprudence, both of
which extol it. Paternity cases state that where the biological father of
a child born out of wedlock wishes to block the adoption of his child
by the new husband of the child's mother, he must have made efforts
to "assume an actual relationship of parental responsibility.""0 He
cannot claim parental rights based solely on his biological connection
to the child,"' and mere intention to assume parental responsibility,
without more, is likewise insufficient. This rule is based on the
father's lacking the "clear parental relationship" that a mother has
from her having carried and borne the child."' The rule is not
applicable to married couples, for it is through the act of marriage
that the father is deemed to have shown his parental responsibility."'
Similarly, in the context of abortion rights, a husband's lack of veto
power over his wife's decision to abort her fetus rests on the greater
physical impact the pregnancy has on the wife since she carries the
fetus."' It is not based on her genetic contribution to the fetus.
Abortion and paternity cases may seem readily distinguishable
from surrogacy matters; however, a surrogate herself cannot be
deprived of her right to obtain an abortion, even if she is a gestational
surrogate and has contributed no genetic material to the developing
fetus."5 This right remains in her purely by virtue of her gestative
109. See Dolgin, Emerging Consensus, supra note 20, at 246.
110. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248,260 (1983).
111. See iL ('Parental rights do not spring full-blown from the biological connection
between parent and child. They require relationships more enduring."') (quoting Caban v.
Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380,397 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting)); Nguyen v. I.N.S., 121 S. Ct.
2053, 2062 (2001) (legally recognizable paternity does not result as a matter of biological
inevitability).
112. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 260 n.16 ("'The mother carries and bears the child, and in this
sense her parental relationship is clear."') (quoting Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380,
397 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting)); Dolgin, DEFINING THE FAMILY, supra note 23, at
108-09 n.36, 128.
113. See Lehr, 463 U.S. at 260; Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246,256 (1978).
114. See Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 71 (1976).
Ironically, the importance of the gestative role, if glorified to an extreme, can lead to
burdensome restrictions on the right to an abortion. See Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,852 (1992).
115. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 63.212(1)(i)3(b) (West 1997) ("A preplanned adoption
agreement shall not contain any provision... [r]equiring the termination of the volunteer
mother's pregnancy."), § 742.15 (3)(a) (West 1997) ("The commissioning couple agrees
that the gestational surrogate shall be the sole source of consent with respect to clinical
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role; the genetic mother has no right to demand that she abort or not
abort the fetus. In this way, a gestational surrogate enjoys the same
rights as all gestating mothers, despite her lack of any genetic
connection to the child. Not only does a surrogate have the right to
abort her fetus, but she is usually permitted, under the law of
adoption, "time after a child's birth to reflect on her wishes
concerning the child,', 1 6 even if the intending mother donated the
ovum.117 This legislative judgment appears to have more to do with
the significance of gestation than with genetic connection and may be
one reason, along with concerns about baby selling, 8 why so many
states have shown no interest in enforcing the terms of surrogacy
agreements, whether gestational or traditional.19 Both abortion and
adoption law recognize that the gestating mother is not a mere carrier
or host for the developing fetus. 12° Her gestative contribution alone
entitles her to the privileges of legal motherhood, completely apart
from concerns that surrogacy devalues and commodifies her.
121
intervention and management of the pregnancy."); N.H. REV. STAT. § 168-B:6 (1997); VA.
STAT. § 20-163A (Michie 2000) ("The surrogate shall be solely responsible for the clinical
management of the pregnancy."); UPA § 801(f) ("A gestational agreement may not limit
the right of the gestational mother to make decisions to safeguard her health or that of the
embryo or fetus.").
116. R.R. v. M.H., 689 N.E.2d 790, 796 (1998); see also In re Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr.
2d 893, 894 (Ct. App. 1994); In re Baby M. 537 A.2d 1227, 1244-46 (NJ. 1988); cf Belsito
v. Clark, 67 Ohio Misc.2d 54, 62 (1994) (disapproving of surrogacy agreements'
circumvention of adoption law).
117. See N.H. REV. STAT. § 168-B:25 (IV) (1997) (requiring surrogacy contract to
provide for "[t]he right of the surrogate to keep the child" if she executes and delivers a
signed writing within seventy-two hours of the child's birth); MARTHA A. FIELD,
SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: THE LEGAL AND HUMAN ISSUES 78, 84, 88-9, 97 (1988).
But see Buzzanca v. Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 291 (Ct. App. 1998) (declaring
compelled resort to adoption law in gestational surrogacy cases "an exercise in circular
reasoning").
118. See Doe v. Attorney General, 487 N.W.2d 484,486-87 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992); In re
Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227, 1240 (N.J. 1988).
119. See ALA. CODE § 26-10A-34 (1997); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-218 (1996); D.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 16- 401, 402 (1996); 750 ILCS 45/6(a) (West 1998); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-
8-2.1 (Bums Supp. 1994); IOWA CODE ANN. § 710.11 (West 1997); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 199.590 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1995); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2713 (West 1991); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.853 (West 1997); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21, 200 (1989); N.Y.
DOM. REL. LAW § 121 (McKinney 1997); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-05 (1991); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-7-204 (1997); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.210 (West 1997); W. VA.
CODE § 48-4- 16 (1997); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 69.14 (West 1997); WYO. STAT. § 35-1-410
(1997).
120. See Charo, supra note 18, at 249 ("[P]regnancy is indisputably a biological fusing of
fetal and maternal bodies, health, and well-being.").
121. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 792 (Cal. 1993) (Kennard, J., dissenting)
(canvassing arguments); Doe, 487 N.W.2d at 487 (declaring that the state has a compelling
interest in preventing surrogacy from "reducing [women] to the status of 'breeding
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Not all courts agree that the gestative role is of such great
significance. Indeed, some courts believe that the gestational
presumption of maternity merely embodies the legal recognition of
gestation as the best evidence of a genetic tie in a world where, until
the very recent past, it was medically impossible to separate the
components of gestation and genetics." Belsito v. Clark' is an
example. In that case, Carol Clark agreed to become pregnant with
an embryo produced using the gametes of Shelly and Anthony
Belsito, the intending parents of the child. 24 The Belsitos discovered
that the hospital where the baby would be born would not name
Shelly the mother of the child on the birth certificate and, since Carol
was unmarried, that the child would thus be considered illegitimate."z
Shelly and Anthony asked the court to declare them the legal and
natural parents of the child and to compel the preparer of the birth
certificate to produce a birth certificate reflecting that fact."6 In
ruling for Belsitos's, the court, using paternity cases as precedent,27
declared gestation "subordinate and secondary to genetics."'1
machines"'); cf. RADIN, supra note 18, at 141-42, 144-45, 148-50 (1996); BARBARA KATZ
ROTHMAN, RECREATING MOTHERHOOD: IDEOLOGY AND TECHNOLOGY IN A
PATRIARCHAL SOCIETY 44 (1989) (arguing that governments should refrain from
endorsing surrogate motherhood in part because of its commodification of human life).
But see Christine L. Kerian, Surrogacy: A Last Resort Alternative for Infertile Women or a
Commodification of Women's Bodies and Children?, 12 WIs. WOMEN'S L.J. 113, 163-64
(2001) (arguing that surrogacy does not commodify or exploit women in the way some
feminists and ethicists claim); Shultz, supra note 17, at 336-37, 384 (refuting argument that
surrogacy exploits and enslaves women and explaining that judicial refusal to enforce
surrogacy contracts "reinforces stereotypes of women as unstable, as unable to make
decisions and stick to them, and as necessarily vulnerable to their hormones and
emotions").
122. See Soos v. Superior Court, 897 P.2d 1356, 1360, 1361 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994)
(declaring unconstitutional, on equal protection grounds, surrogacy statute which did not
recognize the maternity of genetic mothers); Arredondo by Arredondo v. Nodelman, 622
N.Y.S.2d 181, 182 (NY Sup. Ct. 1994) (maintaining that genetic mother was legal mother
in gestational surrogacy case where surrogate consented to naming the genetic parents the
legal parents); Andres A. v. Judith N., 591 N.Y.S.2d 946, 948 (NY Fain. Ct. 1992) ("In the
past courts were safe in assuming that the woman who gave birth to a child was that child's
biological mother. However, today due to scientific advances in the area of in-vitro
fertilization the woman who gives life to a child through the birthing process and by
providing the child with sustenance to grow while inside the womb may not in fact be the
biological/genetic mother of that child."); Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760,762-63 (1994).
123. 644 N.E.2d 760.
124. See id. at 761.
125. See id. at 762.
126. See id.
127. Id. at 762, 763 (citing Owens v. Bell, 451 N.E.2d 241 (Ohio 1983); Domigan v.
Gillette, 479 N.E.2d 291 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984)).
128. Id. at 767.
March 2002] PARENTHOOD BY PURE INTENTION
Natural parents, according to the court, were those individuals who
had contributed the genetic material necessary to create the child.9
The court believed this to be true because, due to their common
heritage, a genetic mother is better able to guide and advise her
child. 3° In thus elevating genetics over gestation, the court described
gestation as a mere filtering system that in no way affects the genetic
imprint of the fetus.' Most significantly, the Belsito court adamantly
rejected the intentional-parent approach of Johnson, even though
application of that test would have resulted in the same outcome.132
The court did so on the grounds that "[i]ntent can be difficult to
prove," '33 an intent-based approach to parenthood inappropriately
circumvents adoption law, and proscriptions on selling parental
rights, 4 and, finally, the intent test does not adequately protect the
legally recognized procreative rights of the genetic contributor and
her attendant interest in raising any child resulting from her decision
to procreate .' The end result of Belsito was a test for natural
parentage driven solely by genetic contribution. The application of
such a test renders gestational surrogates no contenders at all for
parenthood, since they contribute no genetic material to the creation
of the child.
Rendering genetics the determinant of maternity in surrogacy
cases is unsurprisingly appealing, because it makes motherhood itself
scientifically verifiable. This emphasis on the meaning of genetic
markers is part of a contemporary sense of and faith in the power of
genetics to alter the face of humanity in very beneficial ways."
129. See id at 762.
130. See id. at 766 ("For the best interest of the child and society, there are strong
arguments to recognize the genetic parent as the natural parent. The genetic parent can
guide the child from experience through the strengths and weaknesses of a common
ancestry of genetic traits."); cf. Shultz, supra note 17, at 331 ("The genetic parent
decisively influences both the physical and psychological makeup of the individual.")
(citation omitted); Hill, supra note 17, at 389-90.
131. See Belsito, 644 N.E.2d at 761-62. But see Shultz, supra note 17, at 331 ("Because
both mothers have a significant 'flesh and blood' relationship to the child, both would
presumably have the felt connection to the child that we associate with biological ties.").
132. See Belsito, 644 N.E.2d at 766.
133. Id. at 764.
134. Id. at 765.
135. Id. at 766.
136. See Shelley Day Sclater et al., Introduction, in WHAT IS A PARENT? A SOCIo-
LEGAL ANALYSIS 15 (Andrew Bainham et al., eds. 1999); Charo, supra note 18, at 232;
Allison Morse, Searching for the Holy Grail: the Human Genome Project and its
Implications, 13 J.L. & HEALTH 219, 220-21, 230-31 (1999) (reporting belief of scientists
that mapping of the human genome "will lead to major advances in medicine and
biotechnology, as well as uncover the essential 'text' of what it means to be human")
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Employing genetics to make parentage determinations reflects other
contexts where genetics are already primary, for example, in adoption
policy and in the law governing the determination of one's sex. For
decades, adoption law policy was and continues to be influenced by
"biologism," a focus on creating adoptive families that appear
genetically related,'37 and some believe the trend toward open
adoption is likewise reflective of this genetic bias.'-" In the
determination of sex, some courts have rejected the primacy of
chromosomes139 relied on by early cases,1" only to return to the
position, at least in cases where the issue is whether a marriage is
valid, that genetics are definitive. 4' This view of the primacy of
genetics is only fed by attempts to render natural gestation fungible
through the development of alternative means of gestation, namely
artificial wombs,142 or to minimize its importance by pointing to the
capacity of incubators to perform it in part.
The treatment of genetics as determinative of our very destiny
has not been without its critics.'" An adoptive father of a child from
China recently asserted, "We live at a time when we have made a
fetish of genetics... a time when the 'traditional family' has been
turned into an ideological club used to bludgeon those who don't
conform to its narrow definition." '145 In line with this criticism is the
fact that not all surrogacy cases, Belsito notwithstanding, contemplate
(citing HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH ADVISORY COMMITrEE, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, REPORT ON THE HUMAN GENOME INITIATIVE 9 (Apr.
1987)).
137. ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, FAMILY BONDS: ADOPTION, INFERTILITY, AND THE
NEW WORLD OF CHILD PRODUCTION 48, 93, 170 (1999) (noting that the law structures
adoption in imitation of biology).
138. See, e.g., Storrow, supra note 8 at 611; Joan Heifetz Hollinger, Authenticity and
Identity in Contemporary Adoptive Families, J. GENDER-SPECIFIC MEDICINE, Nov. 2000,
at 23-24 ("[T]he asserted-equivalence model of adoption attempt[s] to reinscribe the
biogenetic family by creating a legal framework within which the personal and emotional
ties of the 'natural' family [are] to be replicated.").
139. See, e.g., M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204,210-11 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976)
140. See, e.g., Corbett v. Corbett, 2 W.L.R. 1306,1325,1327-28 (1970).
141. See, e.g., Bellinger v. Bellinger, (2000) 3 F.C.R. 733; Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d
223,230 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999). But see In re Gardiner, 22 P.3d 1086, 1110 (Kan. Ct. App.
2001) (rejecting the reasoning of Littleton).
142. See Andrews, CLONE AGE, supra note 1, at 73-74.
143. See Garrison, Technological Family, supra note 23, at 700 n.21; Garrison,
Interpretive Approach, supra note 15, at 915.
144. See, e.g., Charo, supra note 18, at 235 ("[lIt is easy to place too much mystical
importance on genetic connections.").
145. Steven Conn, Special Club Welcomes a Happy Recruit, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 24, 2000,
at 2; see also Hill, supra note 17, at 418 (arguing that genetics is the least compelling basis
for a parentage claim).
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a diminished level of importance for gestation in the determination of
maternity. In particular, both Baby M. and R.R. describe gestation as
a time-consuming non-anonymous commitment that defies
comparison with sperm-and perhaps even egg donation.'46  The
contrast with "surrogate fatherhood," is striking: the donor of sperm
is often anonymous and natural fatherhood is transferred through the
simple medium of consent.'47 Further, the UPA, as well as some state
statutes, while perhaps not directly extolling gestation, nonetheless
prohibits access to surrogacy by intending mothers capable of
gestating a fetus on their own. 4 In contrast, neither the UPA nor the
applicable state statutes similarly prohibit an intending mother's use
of surrogacy where she is capable of providing her own genetic
material but wishes nonetheless to arrange for someone else to do so.
These perspectives, more indicative of how maternity is viewed in
assisted reproduction law than either paternity cases or artificial
insemination statutes, treat gestation as far from fungible and genetics
very nearly so.
Adding to the foregoing considerations is the fact that in neither
Buzzanca nor in Belsito did the surrogate make any claim to
maternity. It is thus uncertain how those courts would have decided
had she done so. Since Belsito specifically rejected Johnson, however,
it is reasonable to speculate that that court would not have found a tie
in the first instance, given its emphasis on the importance of genetics.
Similarly, reading Buzzanca in light of R.R. suggests that had the
gestational surrogate in Buzzanca asserted her interest in parenting
Jaycee, the outcome would not have hinged, as it did in the end,
146. See R.R. v. M.H., 689 N.E.2d 790,795 (Mass. 1998); In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227,
1254-55 (N.J. 1988); see also HOMER H. CLARK, JR., & ANN LAQUER ESTIN, CASES AND
PROBLEMS ON DOMESTIC RELATIONS 456 (6th ed. 2000) ("Obviously, in the case of a
surrogate mother, the biological tie includes pregnancy and childbirth and is thus a far
more substantial connection than that of a sperm donor."); Ruth Colker, Pregnant Men
Revisited or Sperm Is Cheap, Eggs Are Not, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 1063, 1071 (1996); Shultz,
supra note 17, at 331 ("[T]he gestational mother has 'done the work' of nine months of
pregnancy, suffering its attendant physical invasion, the curtailment of behavioral freedom
and the physical pain, risk and economic costs of childbirth.").
147. See Dolgin, Emerging Consensus, supra note 20, at 273.
148. See FLA. STAT. § 742.15 (2)(a)-(c); N.H. REv. STAT. § 168-B:17 (II) (1994) ("The
intended mother shall be medically determined to be physiologically unable to bear a child
without risk to her health or to the child's health."); VA. STAT. § 20-160.B.8 (Michie 2000)
("The intended mother is infertile, is unable to bear a child, or is unable to do so without
unreasonable risk to the unborn child or to the physical or mental health of the intended
mother or the child."); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 803(b)(2), 9B U.L.A. 364 (2001) (listing
requirement for valid surrogacy agreement that "medical evidence shows that the
intended mother is unable to bear a child or is unable to do so without unreasonable risk
to her physical or mental health or to the unborn child").
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merely on who had intended to raise her.149 In Buzzanca, which
followed but expanded on Johnson, had the surrogate raised a claim
to maternity, she would have been the sole claimant to a biological
component of motherhood, rendering intention irrelevant under the
dictates of Johnson. Thus, while intention plus genetic contribution
outweigh the gestational contribution in Johnson, intention without
donation arguably would not in Buzzanca, since intention alone is not
"acceptable proof of maternity"'' 0 and no tie-breaker would be
necessary."' In contrast to Dolgin's conclusion, then, the surrogate's
choice to assert no parental claim was likely quite crucial to the
outcome of Buzzanca. No one but the intending mother in that case
made any claim to Jaycee. Given that no other parents were
available, Buzzanca is hardly a good test of the primacy of intentional
parentage in such a case. Further, subsequent courts hearing assisted
reproduction disputes will not fail to note that, in Johnson, intention
was relevant to break a "tie" between female genetic and gestational
contributors who both claimed maternity and who each had a valid
claim to maternity under the California parentage statute.52  The
Buzzanca court, however, emphasized that "no bona fide attempt has
been made to establish the surrogate as the lawful mother,"' 53
suggesting the potential for a different outcome if it had. In contrast
to Johnson, in neither Buzzanca nor Moschetta was there the need to
break a tie." That Luanne Buzzanca's intended motherhood would
place her on a par with gestational and genetic contributors in a battle
for motherhood is certainly one possible reading of these cases, but it
is not the only one, nor is it the most convincing.'55
The model of motherhood in assisted reproduction law is still
one that gravitates towards some biological connection. The strained
analogy drawn by the Buzzanca court between artificial insemination
and gestational surrogacy is unlikely to be overlooked by subsequent
149. See, e.g., In re Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893, 894 (Ct. App. 1994), in which the
California court declined to apply an intentional parentage standard to a case involving a
traditional surrogate characterized by the court as "without doubt, the 'natural' parent of
the child."
150. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993); see also Garrison, Technological
Family, supra note 23, at 700 ("[N]o one is a parent based on intention.").
151. See also Charo, supra note 18, at 243 (describing other reasons why gestation might
prevail over genetics).
152. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 7003(1) (parent and child relationship may be established..
[b]etween a child and natural mother by proof of her having given birth to the child).
153. Dolgin, Emerging Consensus, supra note 20, at 228.
154. See Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 896 ("There is no 'tie' to break."), cited in
Buzzanca v. Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280,289 (Ct. App. 1998).
155. See Dolgin, Emerging Consensus, supra note 20, at 228.
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courts faced with disputes arising from gestational surrogacy
agreements. The court's equation of artificial insemination and
surrogacy stretches beyond recognition the factual basis upon which
artificial insemination and ovum donation statutes are grounded
beyond recognition. This is because gestation is simply not analogous
to donation. As seen in artificial insemination and oocyte donation
statutes, the law, despite its fetishism of genetics, is plainly more
comfortable with voiding any claims to parentage of donors of
gametic material than it is with voiding the claims of gestational
surrogates. Moreover, artificial insemination statutes, by themselves,
do not contemplate the wide range of potential parents in a case like
Buzzanca but instead are drawn with a husband, his wife, and, in most
cases, an anonymous sperm donor in mind. Another reason
Buzzanca fails to inspire confidence in an emerging consensus theory
is that it is not a case of a tie between contributors of the biological
components of maternity, and so intention cannot be employed to
resolve the case in the same way it was in Johnson. Buzzanca's
reliance on intention as an acceptable unitary basis for maternity not
only establishes intention as relevant "when the two means [of
biological maternity] do not coincide in one woman" '156 but effectively
renders intention dispositive when genetic and gestational
contributors assert no claim to a child. On these terms, it is not
possible to conclude, as Dolgin does, that intention is "legally
equivalent to a genetic or gestational link between putative mothers
and children."'57 The outcome in a case where a gestational surrogate
disputes the claim of the intending mother alone is left unanswered by
Buzzanca"' In fact, the surrogacy cases on the whole leave
important questions about maternity unresolved,'59 questions whose
answers are critical to the determination of whether a consensus is
emerging that demonstrates a readiness on the part of either courts or
legislatures to replace "biogenetic links with links of choice and
intention."'6
156. See id.; Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776,782 (Cal. 1993).
157. Dolgin, Emerging Consensus, supra note 20, at 250.
158. See id. at 253.
159. See id. at 257 ("Whether a future California court or the state legislature vill
premise the parentage of an intending, non-biological mother on adoption in a traditional
surrogacy case remains to be seen.").
160. Id. at 239.
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B. Paternity
The law has historically treated paternity differently from
maternity. Although maternity is considered established by the fact
of giving birth,' paternity is much less certain.'62 In the context of
assisted reproduction, however, paternity is not as potentially
fragmented as is maternity. Although maternity can be severed into
three components,6' paternity, as it does not involve gestation, can be
severed into only two-genetic and intentional.'64 The determination
of paternity by the law of assisted reproduction can best be seen in
the context of artificial insemination by donor (or heterologous
insemination 6'), where a man donates his sperm to a woman who is
not his wife so that she may conceive. 66 The question that arises in
such cases is whether the woman's husband or the donor or neither is
the child's legal father.' 67
Under all statutes that define the paternity ramifications of
artificial insemination by donor, the husband of an artificially
inseminated woman is the father of the resulting child if he consented
to the insemination.'6' Public policy favoring legitimacy and support
161. See Nguyen v. I.N.S., 121 S. Ct. 2053, 2060 (2001) (commenting that a woman's
maternity "is verifiable from the birth itself").
162. See id. at 2059-65 (reasoning that differences in proof of biological parenthood
between mothers and fathers justify different citizenship rules for children born abroad
and out of wedlock).
163. See supra notes 42-51, 60-73 and accompanying text.
164. See Charo, supra note 18, at 249 (noting that a man's sole biological link to his
child is genetic).
165. See People v. Sorenson, 437 P.2d 495, 498 n.2 (Cal. 1968); Dunkin v. Boskey, 98
Cal. Rptr. 2d 44, 53 n.7 (Ct. App. 2000) (explaining difference between homologous and
heterologous insemination); In re Anonymous, 345 N.Y.S.2d 430, 430-31 (N.Y. Sur. Ct.
1973).
166. See Sorenson, 437 P.2d at 498 n.2 (commenting that only heterologous
insemination "raises legal problems of fatherhood").
167. See Bridget R. Penick, Note, Give the Child a Legal Father: A Plea for Iowa To
Adopt a Statute Regulating Artificial Insemination by Donor, 83 IOWA L. REV. 633, 638
(1998). A woman's "domestic partner" would not be a contender for legal fatherhood,
even if he consented to her insemination with the sperm of an anonymous donor. See
Dunkin, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 52 (holding that a former cohabitant who did not sire the child
"does not qualify as either a 'presumed' or 'natural' father of the child").
168. See ALA. CODE § 26-17-21(a) (1992); ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.045 (Michie 2000);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201 (Michie 1998); CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613 (West 1994); COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-4-106 (West 1999); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-774 (2001); FLA.
STAT. Ch. 742.11(1) (Harrison 2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-21 (1999); IDAHO CODE §
39-5405(3) (Michie 1998); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40/2 (2001); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-129
(1995); MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 1-206 (2001); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 46, § 4B
(2001); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.2824(6) (West 1997); MO. REV. STAT. § 210.824
(2000); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106(1) (2001); NEB. REV. STAT. § 126.061(1) (1989);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:3(l) (1994); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44(a) (West 1993);
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for children creates a strong presumption that a husband consented to
his wife's insemination.'69 The typical method of demonstrating
consent is through a signed writing,70 but consent can also be
established orally."' Where a husband gives no written or oral
consent, even in states with no governing statute, he may nonetheless
be liable for support under contract theories or equitable principles."
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11-6(A) (Michie 2001); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney
1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49A-1 (1999); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-03 (1997); OHIO REV.
CODE. ANN. § 3111.95(A) (Anderson 1994); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 552 (1998); OR. REV.
STAT. § 109.243 (1990); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-306 (1996); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §
151.101(a) (Vernon 2000); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158(2) (Michie 2000); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 26.26.050(1) (2001); Wis. STAT. § 891.40(1) (2000); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-103(a)
(Michie 2001); In re adoption of Reams, 557 N.E.2d 159, 163-64 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989)
(conclusive presumption of paternity). But see Welborn v. Commonwealth, 394 S.E.2d
732 (Va. 1990) (statute merely created presumption of husband's paternity; adoption was
more certain way of establishing paternity).
169. See K.S. v. G.S., 440 A.2d 64, 65, 68 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1981); see also Brooks v. Fair,
532 N.E.2d 208, 212-13 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988) (same policies militate against wife's
disavowal of her husband's paternity).
170. See In re Witbeck-Wildhagen, 667 N.E.2d 122, 125 (Ill. Ct. App. 1996) (written
consent is mandatory); Lane v. Lane, 912 P.2d 290, 296 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996) (there was
substantial compliance with writing requirement through pleadings in divorce proceeding);
K.S., 440 A.2d at 68; Anonymous v. Anonymous, 1991 WL 57753, at *6, 10 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.,
Jan. 18, 1991) (unpublished opinion) (insufficient compliance with writing requirement; no
grounds for imposition of equitable estoppel); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 246 N.Y.S.2d
835, 837 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964) (establishing support obligation on implied contract theory);
Gursky v. Gursky, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406,412 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1963) (same).
171. See R.S. v. R.S., 670 P.2d 923, 928 (Kan. 1983) (oral consent created estoppel to
deny paternity); K.S. v. G.S., 440 A.2d 65, 68-69 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1981) (verbal consent).
But see K.B. v. N.B., 811 S.W.2d 634, 637 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991) (oral consent is
insufficient).
172. See People v. Sorenson, 437 P.2d 495, 497-500 (Cal. 1968); In re Marriage of
Adams, 551 N.E.2d 635, 638 (Ill. 1990) (writing requirement might not be so strict as to
preclude finding of parent-child relationship or support obligation on other grounds);
Levin v. Levin, 645 N.E.2d 601, 604, 605 (Ind. 1994) (estoppel to deny support obligation
when consented orally and in writing; state has no artificial insemination statute); In re
Baby Doe, 353 S.E.2d 877, 879 (S.C. 1987) (consent implied from conduct establishes
paternity); K.B. v. N.B., 811 S.W.2d 634, 639 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991) (full knowledge and
willing participation constituted ratification of parent-child relationship); L.M.S. v. S.L.S.,
312 N.W.2d 853, 855 (Wis. Ct. App. 1981) (adopting moral obligation theory); cf
Buzzanca v. Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 282, 288 (Ct. App. 1998) (estoppel precluded
denial of support obligation to child resulting from consent to gestational surrogacy);
Karin T. v. Michael T., 484 N.Y.S.2d 780,784 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1985) ("The contract and the
equitable estoppel which prevail in this case prevent the respondent from asserting her
lack of responsibility by reason of lack of parenthood."). But see Shin v. Kong, 95 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 304, 310 (Ct. App. 2000) (where consent was not obtained for procedure,
husband could not have parental liability imposed upon him even via equity).
Such principles may also estop a wife from denying the paternity of her husband, see,
e.g., State ex rel. H v. P., 457 N.Y.S.2d 488, 492 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982); In re Adoption of
Anonymous, 345 N.Y.S.2d 430, 435-36 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1973); People ex rel. Abajian v.
Dennett, 184 N.Y.S.2d 178, 182 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1958) (wife's conduct estopped her from
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Other cases do not reach a final determination of these issues on
procedural grounds.
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws has addressed paternity and assisted reproduction in at least
three of its uniform acts. The UPA was first promulgated in 1973 and
at that time contained a section addressing paternity in the context of
the use of artificial insemination by married women." The Act
provided that if, under the supervision of a physician, a wife were
artificially inseminated with a donor's semen and with the consent of
her husband, the husband would be the father of the resulting child.'
The UPA further provided that a donor of semen to a licensed
physician was not the father of a resulting child unless the woman
artificially inseminated was his wife. 6 The Uniform Putative and
Unknown Fathers Act, promulgated in 1988, defined an unknown
semen donor as not the father of the resulting child." The Uniform
Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act, also promulgated in
1988, categorically defined sperm donors as non-parents. 8 Portions
of these latter two uniform acts were incorporated into the UPA
when it was revised in 2000, and the new UPA repeals them,'o
denying ex-husband's paternal rights); Brooks v. Fair, 532 N.E.2d 208, 212-13 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1988), a surrogate from raising the artificial insemination statute to negate the claim
of the intending father, see, e.g., In re Matthew B, 284 Cal. Rptr. 18, 34 (Ct. App. 1991)
(surrogate stipulated to the paternity of the intending father); cf. R.R. v. M.H., 689 N.E.2d
790, 795-96 (Mass. 1998) (stating artificial insemination statute inapplicable to surrogacy
arrangements), or even a known donor from asserting paternity, see Leckie v. Voorhies,
875 P.2d 521, 522 (Or. Ct. App. 1994) (donor's signed agreement not to assert paternity
constituted effective contractual waiver).
173. See, e.g., Alexandria S. v. Pacific Fertility Med. Ctr., Inc., 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 23, 25, 33
(Ct. App. 1997) (failure to appeal issue); Kerns v. Schmidt, 641 N.E.2d 280, 284 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1994) (failure to raise issue in lower court); Hill v. Hulet, 881 P.2d 460,462 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1994) (collateral estoppel).
174. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5 (repealed 2000), 9B U.L.A. 407 (2001).
175. See UNIF. PARENTAGE Acr § 5(a) (repealed 2000), 9B U.L.A. 407 (2001).
176. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5(b) (repealed 2000), 9B U.L.A. 408 (2001).
177. See UNIF. PUTATIVE & UNKNOWN FATHERS ACT § 1(2)(ii) (repealed 2000), 9B
U.L.A. 160 (2001) (excluding unknown semen donors and known donors "whose semen
was donated under circumstances indicating that the donor did not anticipate having an
interest in the resulting child" from definition of putative father). Despite the implication
that even a known donor of semen who anticipates having no interest in the resulting child
is included within the scope of this provision, the Comment makes clear that this provision
is meant to apply to unknown semen donors only. See UNIF. PUTATIVE & UNKNOWN
FATHERS ACT § 1 cmt. (repealed 2000), 9B U.L.A. 161 (2001) ("[I]t is left to other law,
such as a 'new biology' Act, to deal with the known donor of sperm used in artificial
insemination.").
178. See UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT § 4(a) (repealed
2000), 9B U.L.A. 265 (2001).
179. See National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Summary:
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leaving the UPA as the sole act promulgated by NCCUSL dealing
with parentage. 8'
Under the language of the former UPA, which some states
adopted without revision, if the recipient is married, the donor's
paternity is severed, even if the recipient's husband did not consent.
' 2
Other statutes alter this provision of the former UPA and sever the
paternity of the donor only where the recipient is married and her
husband consented to the insemination." The balance of the states,
whether they have adopted the language of the former UPA or not,
sever the paternity of the donor in all cases where the recipient was
not the donor's wife.' In this respect, these statutes mirror the
language of the new UPA, which provides likewise.'s
Some statutory enactments also mirror the former UPA's
requirement that a physician supervise the insemination.' 6 Where a
Uniform Parantage [sic] Act,
http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/uniformact-summaries/uniformacts-s-upa.asp ("The two
1988 acts are, also, incorporated into [the new UPA] and lose their separate existence.").
180. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 904, 9B U.L.A. 371 (2001).
181. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT pref. n., 9B U.L.A. 297 (2001).
182. See ALA. CODE § 26-17-21 (1992); MINN. STAT. § 257.56 (2000); MO. REV. STAT.
§ 210.824 (2000); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106(2) (2001); NEB. REV. STAT. § 126.061(2)
(1989); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158(3) (Michie 2000); VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-257(D)
(Michie 2000). A married woman is, of course, not required to obtain the consent of her
husband to be artificially inseminated. See Shin v. Kong, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 304, 310 (Ct.
App. 2000).
183. See ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.045 (Michie 2000); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201
(Michie 1998); FLA. STAT. ch. 742.11 (1) (Harrison 2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-21
(1999); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40/2 (2001); MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 1-206
(2001); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 46, § 4B (2001); MICH. COMP. LAVS ANN. § 333.2824(6)
(West 1997); N.H. REV. STAT ANN. § 168-B:3(II) (1994); N.M. STAT. ANN § 40-11-6(A)
(Michie 2001); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73(1) (McKinney 1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49A-1
(1999); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-03 (1997); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 552 (1998); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 68-3-306 (1996).
184. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613(b) (West 1994); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-4-
106(2) (West 1999); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-775 (2001); IDAHO CODE § 39-5405(1)
(Michie 1998); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1114(f) (1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44(b) (West
1993); OHIO REv. CODE. ANN. § 3111.95(B) (Anderson 1994); OR. REV. STAT. §
109.239(1) (1990); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.050(2) (2001); WIS. STAT. § 891.40(2)
(2000); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-103(b) (Michie 2001). But see Shin, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
310 (concluding statute does not apply where husband's consent not obtained) (citing
Jhordan C. v. Mark K., 224 Cal. Rptr. 530,537-38 (Ct. App. 1986).
185. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 702,703, 9B U.L.A. 355,356 (2001).
186. See ALA. CODE § 26-17-21(a) (1992); ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.045 (Michie 2000);
CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613 (West 1994); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-4-106 (West 1999);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-772(a) (2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 43-34-42 (1999); IDAHO CODE
§ 39-5402 (Michie 1998); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40/3 (2001); MINN. STAT. § 257.56 (2000);
MO. REv. STAT. § 210.824 (2000); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106 (2001); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 126.061 (1989); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44 (West 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11-
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physician is not employed in this capacity, it has been ruled that the
paternity of the donor can be recognized." Finally, like the former
UPA," the language of some state statutes applies only to married
couples who employ the procedure."s It has been suggested, though,
that to deny unmarried women the same privilege granted married
women under these statutes might be unconstitutional." ° Notably, the
language of the new UPA, unlike that of the former UPA, is inclusive
of unmarried women;... the restriction in favor of married couples was
discarded in order to "provide[ ] certainty of nonparentage for
prospective donors."'92 In addition, the new UPA, which has been
enacted by only one state," disposes of the physician requirement'94
6 (Michie 2001); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney 1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
3111.90 (Anderson 1994); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 551 (1998); OKLA STAT. tit. 10, § 553
(1998); OR. REV. STAT. § 677.360 (1990); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.050 (2001); WiS.
STAT. § 891.40 (2000); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-103 (Michie 2001).
187. See Michael J. Yaworsky, Annotation, Rights and Obligations Resulting from
Human Artificial Insemination, 83 A.L.R. 4th 295, 323 (1991) (citing Jhordan C. v. Mark
K., 224 Cal. Rptr. 530 (Ct. App. 1986)). But see McIntyre v. Crouch, 780 P.2d 239, 243
(Or. 1989) (holding that failure to adhere to physician requirement did not entitle donor
to assert paternity).
188. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5(a) (repealed 2000), 9B U.L.A. 407 (2001).
189. ALA. CODE § 26-17-21 (1992); ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.045 (Michie 2000); FLA.
STAT. ch. 742.11(1) (Harrison 2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-21 (1999); MD. CODE ANN.,
EST. & TRUSTS § 1-206 (2001); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 46 § 4B; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 333.2824(6) (West 1997); MINN. STAT. § 257.56 (2000); Mo. REv. STAT. § 210.824
(2000); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106 (2001); NEB. REV. STAT. § 126.061 (1989); N.Y.
DOM. REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney 1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49A-1 (1999); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14-18-03 (1997); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 551-53 (1998); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-
306 (1996). But see In re Adoption of Michael, 636 N.Y.S.2d 608, 609 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1996)
(statute applied to woman unmarried at time of birth who later married).
190. See Adoption of Michael, 636 N.Y.S.2d at 609 ("[T]he court [is unaware] of any
distinction, based upon marital status, being mandated by law with regard to a woman's
right to be artificially inseminated. It might very well be unconstitutional for the law to try
to make such a distinction.") (citing Matter of Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397 (N.Y. 1995)); Note,
Reproductive Technology and the Procreation Rights of the Unmarried, 98 HARV. L. REV.
669, 682, 683-84 (1985).
191. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 702 cmt., 9B U.L.A. 355 (2001) ("UPA (2000)
further opts not to limit nonparenthood of a donor to situations in which the donor
provides sperm for assisted reproduction by a married woman.").
192. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 702 cmt., 9B U.L.A. 355 (2001).
193. Enactment of the new UPA was considered recently by the legislatures of
Maryland, Minnesota, Texas, and West Virginia. See National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, A Few Facts About... The Uniform Parentage
Act (2000), available at http://wwwv.nccusl.orgluniformact-factsheets/uniformacts-fs-
upa.htm. Of these four states, the Act, save for article 8 relating to gestational
agreements, was adopted only in Texas. See id.; Tex. Fam. Code §§ 160.101 - .707 (Vernon
1997).
194. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 702 cmt., 9B U.L.A. 355 (2001).
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and in this way reflects the enactments of many states that have no
such requirement.195
Courts construing the various statutes described above have
afforded married couples more protection against intrusion by genetic
fathers than they have afforded single women and lesbian couples.196
Of course, sperm donation is very often made anonymously,"9
without the expectation of any contact between the donor and the
donee and her child or even knowledge of their identities 98 As such,
paternal responsibility is not assumed by anonymous sperm donors."'
But single women and lesbian couples face private discrimination in
access to artificial insemination services" and thus may elect to self-
inseminate with the sperm of known donors2°' Where they do, the
sperm donors have often been successful in asserting paternity, a
195. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201 (Michie 1998); FLA. STAT. ch. 742.11(1)
(Harrison 2001); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-129 (1995); MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 1-
206 (2001); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 46, § 4B (2001); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
333.2824(6) (West 1997); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:3(II) (1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
49A-1 (1999); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-03 (1997); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-306 (1996);
VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158(2) (Michie 2000).
196. See Charo, supra note 18, at 240.
197. See C.M. v. C.C., 377 A.2d 821, 822 (N.J. Juv. & Dom. Rel. 1977) ("In most cases
the donor is unknown").
198. Even in the recent case of a sperm donor who was compelled to submit to a
deposition, the court ruled that his identity should remain undisclosed to the extent
possible. See Johnson v. Superior Court, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 864, 879 ( Ct. App. 2000) ("John
Doe's identity is to be protected to the fullest extent possible...").
199. See, e.g., C.M., 377 A.2d at 823 (commenting that anonymous donors cannot be
responsible for the use made of their sperm) (citing People v. Sorenson, 437 P.2d 495, 498
(1968)); In re Michael, 636 N.Y.S.2d 608,609 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1996) ("[W]here a man
donates his sperm to a medical facility to be used for the purpose of artificial insemination,
and all parties agree from the outset that they are forever to remain anonymous from each
other, there is no reason why the forfeiture of the man's parental rights without further
notice should depend upon 'the luck of the draw' because his sperm was utilized to
impregnate a married woman instead of one who was not.").
200. See Charo, supra note 18, at 241; Catherine DeLair, Ethical, Moral, Economic and
Legal Barriers to Assisted Reproductive Technologies Employed by Gay Men and Lesbian
Women, 4 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 147, 150-51 (2000); Holly J. Harlow, Paternalism
Without Paternity: Discrimination Against Single Women Seeking Artificial Insemination
by Donor, 6 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 173, 175 (1996); Derek J. Jones, Family
Law, Health Law & Bioethics: Towards Equal Access to Donor Insemination Services,
Abstract for the International Society of Family Law Conference 2001, Kingston, Canada,
14-16 June 2001; Audra Elizabeth Laabs, Lesbian ART, 19 LAW & INEQ. 65,82 (2001); see
also Joan C. Callahan & Dorothy E. Roberts, A Feminist Social Justice Approach to
Reproduction-Assisting Technologies: A Case Study on the Limits of Liberal Theory, 84
KY. L.J. 1197, 1217 (1995-96) (noting disparities based on race in the provision of fertility
services); Dorothy E. Roberts, Race and the New Reproduction, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 935,
940-42 (1996) (suggesting underlying causes of racial disparity in fertility treatment).
201. See DeLair, supra note 200, at 163.
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result these women wish to avoid in order to safeguard the integrity
of their families. m The most curious aspect of such decisions is that
they disregard the plain language of the applicable legislative
enactments2 3 or, in the more egregious cases, the existence of family
units of long standing.2' Just as in cases involving married couples,
the justifications these decisions advance are the policies favoring
avoidance of both illegitimacy and the risk that a child will become a
public charge."0 It is not known whether the claims of known donors
could have a similarly harmful impact on a traditional nuclear
family.
206
The risk that children will be deemed illegitimate is largely
eliminated where the child is born to a married couple, and the risk
that a child will become a public charge is lessened where the child
has two parents from whom to claim support. Under the new UPA,
the first of these concerns is addressed by a presumption of paternity
that prevents the husband from disclaiming paternity if he fails to
202. See Charo, supra note 18, at 241-42, 247. See, e.g., Thomas S. v. Robin Y., 618
N.Y.S.2d 356, 357, 362 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994); In re R.C., 775 P.2d 27, 35 (Colo. 1989)
(statutory protection of recipient does not apply where parties had an agreement that
donor's parental rights would be preserved); C.O. v. W.S., 64 Ohio Misc.2d 9,11 (1994)
(same); In Circuit Court, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Aug. 5, 1997, at 3 (reporting ruling that
"the act does not intend to bar a known donor from trying to assert his parental rights").
But see McIntyre v. Crouch, 780 P.2d 239, 243 (Or. 1989) (holding statute applies even
where physician does not perform insemination, donor is not anonymous, and recipient is
unmarried); Leckie v. Voorhies, 875 P.2d 521, 522 (Or. Ct. App. 1994) (known donor not
entitled to legal recognition of paternity because he agreed not to assert paternity); In re
Matthew B, 284 Cal. Rptr. 18, 34 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (surrogate stipulated to the
paternity of the intending father).
203. See, e.g., In Circuit Court, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Aug. 5, 1997, at 3 (reporting
ruling that act barring paternity claim by donor who is not the wife of the recipient did not
apply to bar a known donor from trying to assert his parental rights); see Garrison,
Interpretive Approach, supra note 15, at 904 ("[A]Ithough facially neutral, the law
discriminates in practice between sperm donors who give directly to users and those who
give to sperm banks.").
204. See, e.g., Thomas S. v. Robin Y., 618 N.Y.S.2d 356, 357-58 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994);
id. at 364 (Ellerin, J., dissenting) (noting that the sperm donor did not seek to establish his
paternity of a child who lived with her two mothers and her sister until the child was
nearly ten years of age).
205. See Penick, supra note 167, at 657 (citing Brooks v. Fair, 532 N.E.2d 208, 212-13
(Ohio Ct. App. 1988)).
206. See id at 649 n.125 (noting the absence of such cases). The new UPA implies that
a known donor who donates his semen for the use of a married couple would have no
claim to paternity. See UNIF. PARENTAGE AcT §§ 702 cmt., 9B U.L.A. 355 (2001) ("If a
married woman bears a child of assisted reproduction using a donor's sperm, the donor
will not be the father in any event."), § 705 cmt., 9B U.L.A. 357 (2001) (providing that if
"the husband's lack of consent is demonstrated, the child will be without a legally-
recognized father because the sperm donor is not the father under § 702....").
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bring a lawsuit within two years of his discovery of the child's birth.2 O
This provision, unlike the former UPA, limits the husband's power to
disclaim paternity and, in this way, more effectively promotes
legitimacy. The second of these concerns is less directly addressed by
the new UPA. The Act defines the term donor broadly to mean "an
individual who produces sperm used for assisted reproduction"'  and
categorically denies semen donors any claim to paternity,209 presenting
the possibility that a single woman electing to undergo artificial
insemination will be the resulting child's sole parent.210 At the same
time, though, the new UPA inexplicably makes no mention of the
distinction between known and anonymous donors that has been so
salient in the case law.211 Instead, the new UPA describes donors
generally as "shielded from parenthood in all situations in which
either a married woman or a single woman conceives a child through
assisted reproduction. 212  The use of the word shielded here is
striking; it suggests the group of donors who desire "certainty of
nonparentage '213 and who, given this motivation, would actively seek
anonymity. Read in this light, the new UPA does not address the
group of donors who at the time of their donation have not decided
whether they wish to be fathers or who, between the time of
conception and birth, change their minds. 214 The new UPA, then, very
nearly invites courts to continue drawing the distinction between
known and unknown donors that they have drawn in several cases to
date.215
207. See UNIF. PARENTAGE AcT § 705(a)(1), 9B U.L.A. 357 (2001). If the husband
and wife have not lived together since her insemination, and if the husband never held the
child out as his own, his lawsuit may be brought at any time. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT
§ 705(b), 9B U.L.A. 357 (2001)
208. UNIF. PARENTAGE Acr § 102(8), 9B U.L.A. 304 (2001). Of course, this definition
does not include "a husband who provides sperm... to be used for assisted reproduction
by the wife...." UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 102(8)(A), 9B U.L.A. 304 (2001).
209. See UNIF. PARENTAGE Acr § 702 cmt., 9B U.L.A. 355 (2001) ("The donor can
neither sue to establish parental rights, nor be sued and required to support the resulting
child. In sum, donors are eliminated from the parental equation.").
210. See UNIF. PARENTAGE Acr § 702 cmt., 9B U.L.A. 355 (2001) ("'[The child would
have no legally recognized father."') (quoting UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED
CONCEPTION AT § 4 cmt. (repealed 2000), 9B U.L.A. 265 (2001)).
211. See supra notes 199-202 and accompanying text.
212. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 702 cmt., 9B U.L.A. 355 (2001).
213. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 702 cmt., 9B U.L.A. 355 (2001).
214. See Fred A. Bernstein, This Child Does Have Two Mothers... and a Sperm Donor
with Visitation, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 46 (1996); Garrison, Interpretive
Approach, supra note 15, at 904.
215. Professor John Sampson, who served as the reporter for the new UPA, has
commented that a donor who intends to be a father "can be found not to be a 'donor' [,
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No matter how large the question of a known sperm donor's
status looms under the new UPA,216 more important as a driving force
behind the model legislation is the presumed intent of anonymous
sperm donors and husbands. On the one hand, anonymous sperm
donors are presumed to have no interest in the rights and obligations
of paternity.217 Their parental rights are severed in all cases. 2 8 On the
other hand, husbands are presumed to consent to parenthood and
must take affirmative steps if they wish not to do so."9 In essence, the
UPA frees a sperm donor from the obligation of supporting his child,
a privilege a father who has sired a child through coitus, even if the
father is not married to the child's mother, cannot claim.22 The
statute thus creates a striking contrast between the paternity of
children created via assisted reproduction and those created via
coitus. This different treatment of biological fathers based on the
mechanics of how their children were conceived has heretofore been
unknown in the law, a fact of great concern to Professor Marsha
Garrison."2 Garrison believes creating different parentage rules for
assisted reproduction cases is a bad idea in general and, more
specifically, that any emphasis on intention in determining parentage
in such cases is unnecessary and even dangerous.m According to
Garrison, the danger lies in ignoring important facts: the law has
since] if the understanding between him and the mother was that they intended him to
have parental rights,... "he would resemble a husband who contributes his own sperm to
be used by his wife for assisted reproduction. See Uniform Parentage Act (2000) (with
Unofficial Annotations by John J. Sampson, Reporter), 35 FAM. L. Q. 83,162 n. 73 (2001).
216. See Garrison, Interpretive Approach, supra note 15, at 848 (noting failure of
artificial insemination legislation to define a "donor's rights to a relationship with his
biological child").
217. See C.M. v. C.C., 377 A.2d 821, 824 (NJ. Juv. & DOM. REL. 1977) ("By donating
his semen anonymously, the donor impliedly gives it without taking on [the responsibilities
of fatherhood].").
218. See UNIF. PARENTAGE AcT § 702 cmt., 9B U.L.A. 355 (2001) ("[D]onors are
eliminated from the parental equation.").
219. See UNIF. PARENTAGE Acr § 703 cmt., 9B U.L.A. 356 (2001) (noting "[tihe
presumptive paternity of the husband of a married woman who bears a child through
assisted reproduction").
220. See Marsh v. Clay, No. D-225561, 2000 WL 1900333, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 28,
2000) (unpublished opinion); Piatt v. Schultz, No. 03-97-00142-CV, 1998 WL 476725, at *3
(Tex. Ct. App. Aug. 13, 1998) (unpublished opinion) (noting that the Texas constitution
does not forbid treating sperm donors differently from men who impregnate their partners
via coitus).
221. See Garrison, Interpretive Approach, supra note 15, at 921; Garrison,
Technological Family, supra note 23, at 700.
222. See Garrison, Interpretive Approach, supra note 15, at 859-63, 919; Garrison,
Technological Family, supra note 23, at 700.
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never recognized intentional parenthood,' and technological
reproduction does not create genuinely new or different family
forms.f4 Since naming a husband the father of a child born to his wife
via artificial insemination by donor is essentially a result required
under marital presumption and paternity estoppel principles,"" and
since single women who become single mothers through heterologous
insemination are not in any way a new kind of family,' 6 Garrison
urges courts to apply well-established, traditional methods of
determining parentage in these cases and, in the interest of fairness,
to reject special theories applicable only to technological families.'m
Not to employ this "interpretive" approach, she believes, will unsettle
parentage law with inconsistent and unpredictable outcomes.2
An approach to legal parentage that is faithful to time-honored
legal traditions has much to recommend it, but Garrison's conviction
about the efficacy of the interpretive approach seems to arise from
certain premises that are not as fixed as she describes them. First,
although it is true that families created through assisted reproduction
look very much like families created through coitus, this fact alone
does not address the question of whether the parentage of children
created through assisted reproduction should be defined using
different legal principles. The law defines relationships as familial not
simply based on their appearance but upon the events that have
forged them. Similarity of appearance, standing alone, is not
compelling, even to an interpretive approach, unless the similarity is
sufficiently substantial as well to counsel pursuit of similar policy
goals. Even presumptions themselves may require inquiry into
"mechanics," appropriately defined as ways of creating linkages
between family members. Marital presumptions of paternity, for
example, do not apply unless there is a marriage; likewise, gestational
223. See Garrison, Technological Family, supra note 23, at 700.
224. See Garrison, Interpretive Approach, supra note 15, at 874, 880, 881; Garrison,
Technological Family, supra note 23, at 691,697 (explaining that there is no evidence "that
the families that arise from technological conception are markedly different from those
that arise from sexual conception, adoptions, or... from shared family life").
225. See Garrison, Interpretive Approach, supra note 15, at 896; Garrison, Technological
Family, supra note 23, at 695, 701; see also Garrison, Interpretive Approach, supra note 15,
at 897 (arguing that under equal protection wives should benefit from a marital
presumption in egg donation cases); Garrison, Technological Family, supra note 23, at 698.
226. See Garrison, Interpretive Approach, supra note 15, at 881, 903, Garrison,
Technological Family, supra note 23, at 694.
227. See Garrison, Interpretive Approach, supra note 15, at 843, 873, 879, 882; Garrison,
Technological Family, supra note 23, at 700.
228. See Garrison, Interpretive Approach, supra note 15, at 842; Garrison, Technological
Family, supra note 23, at 700.
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presumptions of maternity have no force unless it is known who gave
birth to the child.29 These points are simple, but they emphasize that
the law's focus on "the formation of family relationships" must
scrutinize mechanics to a certain extent if the process of defining
families is to work, for the mechanics are themselves what forge the
relationships the law will or will not recognize as familial.
Technological conception has severed these linkages into several
components, leaving indeterminacy of legal parentage in its wake."
Once the law resolves this indeterminacy in any given case, it is true
that the resulting "technological" family looks in many ways the same
as a non-technological family. But this fact does not itself answer
legal questions about the relationships between the members of a
family. What the interpretive approach should recognize is that
technological family relationships are sometimes formed in such a
way that the indicia for defining traditional family relationships are
missing. Thus, although technological families may simply be
traditional-family look-alikes, the means of achieving these analogues
may require modifications to well-established approaches to
parentage.
Second, Garrison mischaracterizes at least some of the
traditional law of parentage.22 Although "mother" has traditionally
meant the mother by blood, 33 it does not follow that genetic
maternity traditionally prevails over gestational maternity.'
229. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 201, 9B U.L.A. 309 (2001).
230. See Garrison, Interpretive Approach, supra note 15, at 880 (emphasis added,
emphasis in original withdrawn).
231. See Garrison, Interpretive Approach, supra note 15, at 912 (noting this
phenomenon in the context of gestational surrogacy); Garrison, Technological Family,
supra note 23, at 699.
232. See Garrison, Interpretive Approach, supra note 15, at 913 (gestational mother's
claim should be rejected because policy favors genetic parentage); id. at 917 (genetic tie
should take precedence over gestation); Garrison, Technological Family, supra note 23, at
695-696 (characterizing women who gestate other women's eggs as not biologically related
to the resulting children); id. at 699 (same).
233. 59 AM. JUR. 2D Parent and Child § 2 (1987); see also 67A C.J.S. Parent (1978);
Arredondo by Arredondo v. Nodelman, 622 N.Y.S.2d 181, 182 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994)
(maintaining that genetic mother was legal mother in gestational surrogacy case where
surrogate consented to naming the genetic parents the legal parents).
234. See Andres A. v. Judith N., 591 N.Y.S.2d 946, 950 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1992)
(acknowledging that assisted reproduction raises possibility of two mothers); Thomas C. v.
Physicians Ins. Co. of Wisconsin, 509 N.W.2d 81, 83 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993) ("Our review of
the case law and statutory authority leads us to conclude that a parent is not to be defined
solely as a biological mother or father."); ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE, supra note
4, at 135 n.48 ("The assumption is that the courts would recognize both genetic and
gestational mothers as parents within the family code .... "); Charo, supra note 18, at 250
(listing countries where gestation defines motherhood); Ryiah Lilith, The G.I.F. T. of Two
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"Mother" is more accurately defined as "one who generates a
child." 5  As noted above, assisted reproduction has severed a
woman's role in generating a child into three components and a man's
role into two. Before the advent of parentage disputes occasioned by
assisted conception, the law had little need to resolve disputes over
maternity and, as a result, the question of legal maternity remains
largely untheorized.26  Not surprisingly, family law treatises often
contain no discussion of legal maternity.237 Casebooks likewise often
contain no discussion of ascertaining maternity outside of materials
on assisted reproduction and, in this context, present Johnson and
Buzzanca as authoritative texts.238 Where maternity is defined, it is
said to be presumed from gestational maternity.3 Gestational
maternity is in this way analogous to marital-presumption paternity.2"
In neither the case of presumptive maternity nor the case of
presumptive paternity, however, is it sufficient to locate the genetic
parent in order to trump the presumption.241  Allowing genetic
contribution to override presumptive maternity but not presumptive
Biological and Legal Mothers, 9 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 207, 216 (2001)
(describing case where both genetic and gestational mothers were named legal mothers).
But see Dr. Chaim Povarsky, Regulating Advanced Reproductive Technologies: A
Comparative Analysis of Jewish and American Law, 29 U. TOL. L. REv. 409, 482 (1998)
(opining that Jewish law probably prefers the definitude of genetic motherhood); cf.
Charo, supra note 18, at 250 (noting that Israel "has adopted a genetic definition of
motherhood").
235. 59 AM. JUR. 2D Parent and Child § 2 (1987); see also 60 C.J.S. Mother (1969)
("Ordinarily the term means a woman who has borne a child."). "The term mother... is
customarily applied to one who is an adoptive mother .... Id.; see also Burlington
County Welfare Bd. v. McClain, 458 A.2d 1348, 1349 (N.J. Dist. Ct. 1983) ("[Mother] is
defined either as one gives birth to a child, or a female who adopts a child.") (citations
omitted).
236. See Arredondo, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 181 (remarking that statutory grant of jurisdiction
to Family Court contained no provision for a declaration of maternity); Andres A., 591
N.Y.S.2d at 949 (same); Garrison, Interpretive Approach, supra note 15, at 912 ("[T]he law
has rarely confronted the question of legal motherhood at all.").
237. See, e.g., HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1988).
238. See, e.g., CLARK & ESTIN, supra note 146, at 442-43, 445; HARRY D. KRAUSE, ET
AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES, COMMENTS, AND QUESTIONS 50-56, 390-97, (4th ed. 1999 &
Supp. 2000); SCHNEIDER & BRINIG, supra note 22, at 897-926.
239. See UNIF. PARENTAGE AcT § 201(a)(1), 9B U.L.A. 309 (2001); Nguyen v. I.N.S.,
533 U.S. 53 (2001) ("In the case of the mother, [maternity] is verifiable from the birth
itself.").
240. See UNIF. PARENTAGE AcT §§ 201(b)(1), 204, 9B U.L.A. 309,311 (2001).
241. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 129-30 (1989) (upholding statutory
denial of standing to genetic father to challenge marital-presumption paternity); Johnson
v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993) (privileging intent when biological means of
establishing maternity "do not coincide in one woman").
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paternity, would, according to Garrison, be of doubtful
constitutionality2 42 and would thus offend the interpretive approach's
commitment to consistency and neutrality.243  Nevertheless,
differences between maternity and paternity have many times been
marshalled as justifiable and substantial grounds for differential
treatment of motherhood and fatherhood, particularly based on
mothers' gestative role in childbearing.244 This differential treatment
appears most assuredly to rely on "traditional stereotypes of female
nurturance,"'245 but this is a well-established approach in equal
protection law generally and in family law in particular and continues
to be so.246 That this should not be the case and that the law instead
should make genetics the focal point of every parentage
determination is a position not encompassed by the interpretive
approach.247
There is no doubt that the interpretive approach applies neatly to
resolve many parentage issues arising from the use of assisted
reproduction.24 But like the top-down methodologies Garrison
criticizes,249 the interpretive approach cannot resolve all of these
issues.' In particular, although the interpretive approach nicely
addresses disputes between husbands and wives and even between
242. See Garrison, Interpretive Approach, supra note 15, at 882 (citing Soos v. Superior
Court, 897 P.2d 1356 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994)); id. at 914, 917; Garrison, Technological
Family, supra note 23, at 698.
243. See Garrison Interpretive Approach, supra note 15, at 878-82, 920.
244. See supra notes 110-13 and accompanying text; infra notes 385-422 and
accompanying text. Despite this evidence, Garrison claims "the unwed father cases in fact
convey no message about gestation." Garrison, Interpretive Approach, supra note 15, at
913 n.349 (contradicting DOLGIN, DEFINING THE FAMILY, supra note 23, at 128 (claiming
the unwed-father cases carry a "message about the importance of gestation")).
245. See Garrison, Interpretive Approach, supra note 15, at 914.
246. See e.g., Nguyen v. I.N.S., 533 U.S. 53 (2001) ("Fathers and mothers are not
similarly situated with regard to the proof of biological parenthood. The imposition of a
different set of rules for making that legal determination with respect to fathers and
mothers is neither surprising nor troublesome from a constitutional perspective."); United
States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (commenting that "[p]hysical differences
between men and women.., are enduring" and can justify gender-based classifications
substantially related to important governmental objectives).
247. See Garrison, Interpretive Approach, supra note 15, at 920-21 (describing the
neutrality of the interpretive approach).
248. See id. at 896-98 (discussing "easy" cases).
249. See id. at 853-68 (criticizing rights-based, contracts-based, and anticommodification
approaches to assisted reproduction issues).
250. See id. at 896 ("[The interpretive approach] will not resolve every question related
to the parentage of technologically conceived children."). But see id& at 920 ("[T]he
interpretive approach can be applied to all of the parental status issues arising from
technological conception.").
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single women and known sperm donors, the approach seems ill-
equipped to resolve potential cases involving the children of single
women who have been artificially inseminated with the sperm of
anonymous donors. If a woman gives birth to a child with the aid of
anonymous insemination, her relationship with her child looks very
much like that of a woman who became pregnant through a casual
encounter." I The interpretive approach would counsel that these two
scenarios be treated similarly 2 and in line with the law's preference
for two-parent families, naming the biological father the legal father
of the child.f3 But when the mechanics involved in these two
situations are scrutinized, any substantial similarity between them
vanishes. True, anonymous lovers do not always remain conveniently
anonymous after a child has been conceived and may come forward
to assert a paternity claim. Likewise, anonymous sperm donors may
not remain steadfast in their resolution not to assert paternity.2s
Their ability to discover the children they have sired would be
difficult but by no means impossible.'5 More significantly, whatever
contract they may have signed with a sperm bank would not by itself
undermine a paternity claim.256 In essence then, through this strained
comparison, the fathers in these two scenarios can be made to appear
similar. And yet both the artificially inseminated mother, and the
anonymous sperm donor, by following the dictates of the relevant
statute (or their own common sense), have taken more definitive
steps towards ensuring the donor will not become a part of the
mother's family. These steps to ensure anonymity suggest a basis
upon which the parental perogatives of the mother alone, at least
251. See Garrison, Technological Family, supra note 23, at 694.
252. See Garrison, Interpretive Approach, supra note 15, at 910 ("There is simply no
logical basis for a one-parent policy applicable only to single AID users.").
253. See id. at 906-07, 911 (raising the law's preference for two-parent, marital families).
254. See Cahn, supra note 20.
255. See CLARK & ESTIN, supra note 146, at 453 (remarking that use of sperm banks by
anonymous donors entails "little risk that the donor will later seek to assert parental
rights"); Garrison, Interpretive Approach, supra note 15, at 904 ("Because sperm banks
provide anonymity to both donors and recipients, paternity litigation is effectively
foreclosed."); But see Cahn, supra note 20.
256. Garrison, Technological Family, supra note 23, at 698 ("It is black letter family law
that contracts between parents that determine parental status, child custody, and child
support are voidable. .. "); see also Garrison, Interpretive Approach, supra note 15, at 860
(citing UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 6(d), 9B U.L.A 303 (1973)), 861-62, 896. But see In re
R.C., 775 P.2d 27, 35 (Colo. 1989) (remanding for determination of whether recipient
agreed donor would have parental rights); C.O. v. W.S., 64 Ohio Misc.2d 9, 11 (1994)
(holding paternity adjudication was not statutorily barred where unmarried woman agreed
donor and child would have relationship); Leckie v. Voorhies, 875 P.2d 521, 522 (Or. Ct.
App. 1994) (contract signed with birth mother undermined paternity claim).
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insofar as the policy of support for children is concerned, could be
respected, in contrast to the casual sexual encounter where
anonymity, no matter how resolute the intentions of the participants,
is harder to control 57
Similarly, the interpretive approach appears ill-suited to address
the facts of Buzzanca, a "five-parent case."" s  On the one hand,
Garrison argues that the case is analogous to a prenatal "adoption""
and that simple estoppel principles would apply in such a case to
name both Luanne and John Buzzanca the parents of Jaycee.26°
Although the Buzzanca court did invoke estoppel, its brand of
estoppel does not meet the rigorous standards of the interpretive
approach. It relies not on any recognized legal parent, marital
presumption, or established relationship to which estoppel
traditionally attaches in the parentage context.261 Instead, it relies
solely on the intentions of the Buzzancas.262 This understanding of
estoppel is less faithful to the interpretive approach than it is to
Professors Shultz's and Hill's intentional parenthood theory, which
Garrison refutes.263 Notably, in later treatment of Buzzanca, Garrison
eschews any estoppel analysis of that case and admits that gestational
surrogacy is distinct from sexual conception.264 She then explains that
257. See Garrison, Interpretive Approach, supra note 15, at 860 (noting that "even
unmarried persons who engage in sexual intercourse have been presumed to consent to
the risk of procreation").
258. Garrison, Technological Family, supra note 23, at 698.
259. See id. at 696.
260. See id. at 698 ("[B]oth parties, by consenting to the birth of the child, should
logically incur the legal status and responsibilities of parenthood.").
261. See Nancy S. v. Michele G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212, 218 (Ct. App. 1991) (holding
equitable estoppel not available in favor of nonparent); In re M.J. 759 N.E.2d 121, 123, 127
(Ill. Ct. App. 2001) (refusing to impose support obligation, on grounds of promissory
estoppel, on boyfriend who helped pay for and allegedly encouraged artificial
insemination, supported the resulting offspring and allegedly acknowledged the children
as his own and promised to support them), Van v. Zahorik, 597 N.W.2d 15, 23 (Mich.
1999) (holding doctrine of parenthood by equitable estoppel not applicable outside of
marriage); Simmons v. Comer, 438 S.E.2d 530, 537 (W. Va. 1993) (observing "common
pattern" of application of estoppel where putative father married biological mother);
CLARK, supra note 237, § 4.4 at 192, § 4.5 at 200-01; AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE,
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.03(1)(b) (Tentative Draft No. 4, Apr. 10, 2000) (requiring co-
parenting agreement with legally recognized parent and residing with child) [hereinafter
PRINCIPLES]; UNIF. PARENTAGE ACr § 608 cmt., 9B U.L.A. 343 (2001) (noting that
doctrine of paternity by estoppel "is limited in its application to married persons").
262. See Buzzanca v. Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 286 (Ct. App. 1998) (estoppel
applies in artificial insemination context to fix parental status and responsibility).
263. See Garrison, Interpretive Approach, supra note 15, at 859-63.




the law's preference for genetic motherhood the mere gestational
mother in a surrogacy case should not qualify for a declaration of
maternity.265 But, again, the law is only beginning to wrestle with
contests between gestational and genetic contenders for motherhood.
Whether priority should be given to one or the other or to neither is
still a matter of serious debate. The interpretative approach does not
satisfactorily resolve this debate. As such, Garrison's analysis of
Bussanca is, at the very least, not supported by the interpretive
approach and is very likely inconsistent with it.26
The interpretive approach to legal parentage, based as it is on
valued legal traditions, has much to offer in resolving parentage
disputes arising in assisted reproduction cases. It is neither anemic
nor necessarily overly conservative in its respect for consistency,
neutrality and integrity in legal decisionmaking. It may even be
preferable to globalizing theories that provide no reasoned basis upon
which to discard time-honored policies and principles. But like the
globalizing theories it rejects, the interpretive approach also leaves
indeterminacy in its wake. It seems particularly ill-suited to resolve
important questions triggered by cases where single women seek
anonymous donations of sperm and in five-parent surrogacy cases.
Since resort to these arrangements will only increase in frequency
over time, the law should do more than attempt to make them
conform to obviously inapplicable principles or invoke restrictive
policies of doubtful vintage. The clumsiness of such attempts
underscores that even traditional approaches to the family at times
need reexamining." This reexamination might begin with an
acknowledgment that it is not so much that technological families
resemble traditional families as that traditional families resemble
technological ones. In other words, the law's difficulty with
technological families reveals what is lacking in its treatment of
traditional families. In part, this acknowledgment demonstrates that
the law continues to place undue emphasis on marriage in the context
265. See Garrison, Interpretive Approach, supra note 15, at 913 (concluding that a
gestational surrogate's maternity claim is subordinate to a genetic mother's claim);
Garrison, Technological Family, supra note 23, at 699 ("[T]he simplest-and, I would
argue-best approach in these cases is to say that the genetic mother is the legal mother
because she is the one biologically related to the child."). But see Shultz, supra note 17, at
332 ("I would argue that there is no persuasive basis for a categorical preference for either
a gestational or a genetic contributor to receive exclusive recognition as 'mother."').
266. See supra notes 238-41 and accompanying text.
267. See Garrison, Interpretive Approach, supra note 15, at 921 ("The approach I have
suggested does not assume that contemporary standards are ideal, or that they should not
be debated and revised.").
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of parentage determinations. By failing to scrutinize this position,
beyond describing it as a preference for two-parent families, the
interpretive approach does little to address the degree to which
technological families call it into question. Nonetheless, the attempt
to articulate an interpretive approach to parentage determinations in
the context of assisted reproduction does emphasize that, given the
inevitability of parenthood by pure intention, a principled and evenly
applied approach to this type of parentage needs to be identified.
Any remaining indeterminacy is but a cost of the benefits which




H. Parenthood by Pure Intention
Although the interpretive approach should caution courts and
legislatures against creating wholly new bases upon which to ground
parentage, it has not succeeded in persuading them to reject purely
intentional parenthood as an appropriate basis for defining parentage
in assisted reproduction cases.269 Unfortunately, the existing law and
proposed legislation defining the parentage of children born through
the use of assisted reproduction treats married couples who wish to
employ these techniques differently from unmarried couples and
singles who wish to do likewise." Although married couples who
choose to pursue assisted reproduction may define themselves as the
legal parents of a child through the sole medium of their intent to rear
the child, the unmarried are, in the main, denied this privilege." This
development in the law of parentage is unfortunate, as it perpetuates
268. See Harris, supra note 95, at 481 (commenting on the value of a functionality test
for paternity); Shultz, supra note 17, at 398 (stating that assigning and enforcing parental
responsibility is so fraught with problems that a new approach could not be any worse).
269. See, e.g., Buzzanca v. Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280,289-90 (Ct. App. 1998).
270. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 801(b), 9B U.L.A. 362 (2001) ("The intended
parents must be married ... ").
271. For example, although the vast majority of statutes relating to surrogacy simply
outlaw it, see ALA. CODE § 26-10A-34 (1997); ARIz. REV. STAT. § 25-218 (1996); D.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 16401, 16402 (1996); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/6(a) (2001); IND. CODE
ANN. § 31-8-2.1 (Michie 1994); IOWA CODE ANN. § 710.11 (West 1997); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 199.590 (Michie 1995); LA. REV. STAT. § 2713 (West 1991); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 722.853 (West 1997); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,200 (1989); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW
§ 121 (McKinney 1997); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-05 (1991); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-
204 (1997); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.210 (2001); W. VA. CODE § 48-4- 16 (1997); WIs.
STAT. § 69.14 (2000); WYO. STAT. § 35-1-410 (1997), the others, with one exception, limit




the law's failure to recognize the many nontraditional forms of the
family that exist in society today."
Fortunately, within the law of assisted reproduction itself lies the
potential to redefine the family by granting unmarried individuals the
privilege of becoming parents by pure intention. For some time now,
courts and commentators have developed the concept of functional
parenthood as a way to recognize the important relationships children
often forge with individuals who function as their parents but who do
not have that legal status.273 The concept focuses on the actions taken
by the functional parent after the child is born. By contrast, the
doctrine of intentional parenthood allows married couples to be
declared parents at the moment of their child's birth though absent
any evidence that they have "functioned" as parents through genetic
or gestational contributions to the child.274 In such cases, it could be
argued that marriage acts as a proxy for parental functioning much in
the way it does in the Supreme Court's rights-of-unwed-fathers
decisions. 7' Since the concept of functional parenthood focuses on
the time period after the child's birth, however, the doctrine of
intentional parenthood appears devoid of any solid basis to justify its
departure from established parentage doctrine.2 6  It would be
reasonable, though, to read the doctrine of intentional parenthood as
included within the scope of functional parenthood. This reading
would allow the definition of the family to expand from within the
law of assisted reproduction itself. To effect this reading will require
an understanding of the concept of functional parenthood as inclusive
of expressions of intention made before the child's birth. The result
of this understanding will make intentional parenthood, even for the
married, a less radical departure from parentage law generally and,
more specifically, will undergird the argument for extending the
privilege of intentional parenthood to the unmarried.
272. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
273. See infra notes 465-544 and accompanying text.
274. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT art. 8, 9B U.L.A. 360-70 (2001).
275. See Shultz, supra note 17, at 342 ("Entry into legal marriage ... signal[s]
commitment sufficient to ground parenting responsibilities."), but cf June Carbone,
FROM PARTNERS TO PARENTS 126 (2000) (noting that "marriage implies no
particular organization for meeting the needs of children").
276. See Garrison, Interpretive Approach, supra note 15, at 913.
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A. The Theory And Statutory Recognition Of Intentional Parenthood
Although the law of assisted reproduction concerns itself with
multiple issues arising from its use,m it in large measure is concerned
with defining the parentage of children born using assisted
reproduction techniques.Y As was discussed in Part I, intentional
parenthood is not just one of the pieces into which assisted
reproduction fragments parentage. It can also serve as a tie-breaker
between contending holders of the more traditional indicia of
parenthood, namely, genetic and gestational contribution.279 What
new realms will open through the use of this new theory of
parenthood are as yet unknown. Certainly, the theory of intentional
parenthood appears to hold out the promise of breaking free of the
traditional definition of the family and recognizing alternative family
forms. Its treatment to date in statutes and case law has, however,
not pursued this direction.
Some commentators believe that developing the theory that
parentage should vest in those who intended to raise the child will
ameliorate the ideological conservatism of assisted reproduction
law. " Perhaps the most significant articulations of this theory are
those of Professors Marjorie Maguire Shultz and John Lawrence Hill,
the two legal academics whose theories were cited favorably in
Johnson v. Calvert." In Reproductive Technology and Intent-based
Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, Shultz
277. See ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE, supra note 4, at 99-118 (listing "the
scope and meaning of procreative liberty," "the status of preimplantation embryos,"
consumer protection, and funding and access); Lori B. Andrews & Nanette Elster,
Regulating Reproductive Technologies, 21 J. LEGAL MED. 35, 36-45 (2000); Garrison,
Interpretive Approach, supra note 15, at 843 n.29 (listing "commercialism, user/donor
qualifications, and requirements for or bans on particular practices such as postmortem
conception, sex selection, genetic manipulation, cloning, surrogacy, etc.").
278. See HARRY D. KRAUSE, FAMILY LAW IN A NUTSHELL 213 (1995).
279. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776,781 (Cal. 1993).
280. See infra notes 483-578 and accompanying text.
281. See DOLGIN, DEFINING THE FAMILY, supra note 23, at 94; WESTON, supra note 7,
at 33 (noting that most scholarly studies "enthrone human procreation as kinship's
ultimate referent"); id. at 210 (envisioning procreative kinship "as one subset of a larger
kinship universe"); John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception,
Pregnancy, and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REV. 405, 436 (1983) ("The right to noncoital,
collaborative reproduction also includes the right of the parties to agree how they should
allocate their obligations and entitlements with respect to the child. Legal presumptions
of paternity and maternity would be overridden by this agreement of the parties."); Shultz,
supra note 17, at 398 (advocating determining legal parenthood on the basis of intentional
agreements).
282. See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782-83.
283. See Schultz, supra note 16.
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describes the new choices assisted reproduction has created and the
enhanced role of intention in making procreative decisions.' Given
the importance of intention in assisted conception, Shultz believes
that contracts will become significant devices in carrying out these
arrangements.2  She defines intention as the direct, specific,
purposeful and unambiguous link between voluntary behavior and
outcome in the context of a set of alternatives from which to choose'
and proposes that the law of assisted conception, particularly as it
relates to parentage determinations, strive to recognize "the
legitimacy of individual efforts to project intentions.., into the
future."2" To best achieve this goal, Shultz proposes to make
"bargained-for intentions determinative of legal parenthood"m when
assisted reproduction is use& 9 and to police these intentions through
contract law's special protections against choices procured through
overreaching or contrary to reasoned public policy.' She sees the
opportunity for the creation of nontraditional families increasing by
these means "[b]ecause procreation and sexual-interpersonal
intimacy are no longer tied together.... ,,291 She also notes the
gender neutrality of intention as a way for courts to determine
parentage outside the constraints of gender stereotypes and biases.'
In addressing the question "who should be considered the parent
in collaborative-reproduction arrangements," Professor John
Lawrence Hill brings parental autonomy and procreational liberty to
bear in his argument that intentional parents should prevail over
biological or gestational contributors.9 3  He defines intentional
parents as those "who initially intended to raise the child."29 To
satisfy this definition, the intended parents must have planned to have
a child before the conception of the child, must not have strayed from
"morally permissible measures" for bringing the child into the world,
284. See id. at 300.
285. See id. at 325.
286. See id. at 307-310 ("The purpose of those who invoke new reproductive procedures
is clear, specifically targetted and unambiguous."); id. at 396.
287. Id. at 302.
288. Id. at 323.
289. See id. at 324.
290. See id. at 346-69.
291. Id. at 315; see also id. at 344 ("If society were to recognize intention as a basis for
claiming parenthood in circumstances of artificial reproductive techniques, intention-
based variations in family form would likely be better tolerated and less problematic.").
292. See id. at 378-95 (discussing outcome of Baby M. case as a "missed opportunity for
gender-neutral access to children").
293. Hill, supra note 17, at 357-58.
294. Id. at 356 n.12.
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and must have acquired the "constructive consent of the child" by
having met "minimally adequate conditions to be able to raise and
care for the child. 295  Hill supports his argument by positing that
"[w]hat is essential to parenthood is not the biological tie between
parent and child but the preconception intention to have a child,
accompanied by the undertaking of whatever action is necessary to
bring a child into the world, 296 "the preconception commitment of
others" not to claim parental rights,2" and the need for certainty of
parentage from the moment the child is conceived.299 In the course of
his argument, Hill refutes several positions against elevating the
importance of intention in parentage determinations."'
By and large, legislatures have not adopted Shultz's and Hill's
theories. Although the majority of legislative enactments governing
surrogacy simply outlaw the practice&m a few states have passed
statutes in the surrogacy context that recognize the parenthood of
intending parents under certain circumstances.3 But existing state
statutes are unprepared to recognize parenthood by intention alone.
As noted in Table 2, below, Florida, Nevada, New Hampshire and
Virginia's statutes all contain provisions requiring at least one of the
intending parents to be a genetic parent of the child. 2 In addition,
these statutes require that the intending parents be married to each
other.3' As such, these statutes suggest a basis fully apart from
intention-marriage-for overriding the presumed parenthood of the
gestational mother. Under New Hampshire's and Virginia's statutes,
if traditional surrogacy is employed, then the intending father's sperm
295. Id.
296. Id. at 414.
297. See id. at 415.
298. See id. at 417-18 ("[T]he identity of the parents should be determinate ab initio
from the time of conception.").
299. See id. at 388 (considering and rejecting a number of arguments that could be
made for the priority of genetic donors or the gestational host over the claims of the
intentional parents).
300. See Garrison, Interpretive Approach, supra note 15, at 851; Garrison, Technological
Family, supra note 23, at 702.
301. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201 (Michie 1998); FLA. STAT. ch. 742.13(2)
(Harrison 2001); NEV. REV. STAT. 126.045(4)(a) (2001); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-
B:1(XII), 168-B:17(III) (1994); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160(B)(9) (Michie 2000).
302. See FLA. STAT. ch. 742.13(2) (Harrison 2001); NEV. REV. STAT. 126.045(4)(a)
(2001); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-B:1(XII), 168-B:17(III) (1994); VA. CODE ANN. §
20-160(B)(9) (Michie 2000).
303. See FLA. STAT. ch. 742.15(1) (Harrison 2001); NEV. REV. STAT. 126.045(1) (2001);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 88 168-B:1(VII); 168-B:21(II)(b) (1994); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-156
(Michie 2000). Arkansas's unusual statute contains no marriage requirement. See ARK.
CODE ANN. § 9-10.201 (Michie 1998).
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must be used.' In Florida, any traditional surrogacy arrangement
must follow the pattern for the adoption of a child and be judicially
pre-approved." In addition, unlike the other state statutes, New
Hampshire's statute employs an adoption model for all surrogacy
cases, allowing the surrogate to keep the child if she so chooses within
seventy-two hours after the birth of the child.3 ° These exceptions
suggest a special concern for problems that may arise in the use of
traditional surrogacy, problems that may not be adequately dealt with
by the fact that the married couple may have made a genetic
contribution to the child and that the couple is married.'
These statutes fail to provide an opportunity for parenthood by
pure intention and instead seem to respond to the fragmentation of
parenthood by forcing a tie between gestational and genetic
parenthood and breaking the tie by locating intentional parenthood in
a genetic contributor, one of the spouses of a married couple. In this
way, the statutes validate the outcome of Johnson v. Calvert. In that
case, though, a genetic contribution was made by both spouses. s
Genetic contribution by both spouses is not required under the
statutes in question, although marriage of the intending parents is
required. For the spouse who has contributed no genetics, then, it is
her intention plus the fact of her marriage to a genetic contributor
that secures her parenthood. If the purpose of the marriage
requirement is to secure the parenthood of the non-contributor, the
marriage of the intending parents would seem not to be an important
factor in the outcome of cases like Johnson. In support of this
reading of Johnson, developments in California whereby gay male or
lesbian couples employing surrogate mothers may obtain pre-birth
judgments of parentage regardless of their genetic contribution or
marital status suggest that these indicia of parenthood are not
particularly important to the courts of that state where there are
304. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:1(XII)(1994) ("'Surrogacy'... means any
arrangement by which a woman agrees to be impregnated using either the intended
father's sperm, the intended mother's egg, or their preembryo with the intent that the
intended parents are to become the parents of the resulting child after the child's birth.");
VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160(B)(9)(Michie 2000) (requiring court to find that "[a]t least one
of the intended parents is expected to be the genetic parent of any child resulting from the
[surrogacy] agreement").
305. See FLA. STAT. ch. 63.212 (Harrison 2001).
306. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:25 (IV) (1994).
307. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT art. 8 cmt., 9B U.L.A. 361 (2001) (expressing special
concern about traditional surrogacy).
308. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776,778 (Cal. 1993).
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 53
March 2002] PARENTHOOD BY PURE INTENTION 645
identifiable intentional parents.' At this point in time, however, such
an outcome under existing surrogacy statutes that recognize the
parenthood of intending parents would be impermissible.
It is likewise unlikely that these statutes contemplate a scenario
like that arising in Buzzanca v. Buzzanca."° Perhaps if the statutory
language were construed broadly, then genetic contributions from
third-party donors might be deemed sufficient to satisfy the
requirement that at least one of the spouses contribute genetic
material. The language of these statutes has yet to be construed
either broadly or narrowly, but a broad construction appears unlikely,
since the statutes already explicitly permit a married couple to obtain
gametes from, at most, one third party. If, for instance, the wife is the
sole genetic contributor, then plainly a third-party sperm donor is
needed. These statues, then, appear not to contemplate that both sets
of gametes be obtained through third-party donors and thus that
parenthood by pure intention, as validated in Buzzanca, be
unavailable.
The new UPA reflects some aspects of these statutes but departs
from others. Most remarkable is that the UPA explicitly validates the
outcome in a case like Buzzancat ' if the surrogacy contract is
judically validated.12 Moreover, it allows for both traditional and
gestational surrogacy but does not require that at least one intending
parent be the genetic parent. s The UPA does require, however, that
the intending parents be married."4 The rationale for this is said to be
that, given the controversial nature of surrogacy contracts, "the most
worthy fact circumstances meriting legal recognition is the plight of
309. See Milena D. O'Hara & Andrew W. Vorzimer, In re Marriage of Buzzanca:
Charting a New Destiny, 26 W. ST. U. L. REV. 25, 37 (1999) ("It should be noted that
Buzzanca involved a married couple, but the court contemplated its future application to
non-married couples, and, thus, potentially same-sex couples.") (citing Buzzanca v.
Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280,287 n.11 (Ct. App. 1998)); Andrew W. Vorzimer, The Egg
Donor and Surrogacy Controversy: Legal Issues Surrounding Representation of Parties to
an Egg Donor and Surrogacy Contract, 21 WHITTIER L. REV. 415, 426 (1999) (reporting
that attorneys in California "can obtain a birth certificate issued in the names of the
intended parents, even if none of them are genetically related to the child.").
310. 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Ct. App. 1998).
311. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT art. 8 cmt., 9B U.L.A. 360 (2001) ("An egg donor or a
sperm donor, or both, may be involved [in a gestational agreement] . . .
312. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 801(c), 9B U.L.A. 362 (2001)
313. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT art. 8 cmt., 9B U.L.A. 361 (2001) ("[T]he
restriction... that at least one of the intended parents would be genetically related to the
child born of the gestational agreement has been eliminated.").
314. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 801(b), 9B U.L.A. 362 (2001).
childless married couples." '315 Therefore, whereas it is possible under
both the Arkansas and Florida statutes for an unmarried individual to
become a parent via surrogacy even if that individual's gametes are
not used,316 and whereas the UPA removes the requirement that one
of the intending parents contribute gametes, it nonetheless retains the
requirement that the intending parents be married.317 This approach
to surrogacy can be understood in one of two ways: (a) the
arrangement of the intending parents for genetic contributions by
third-party donors is considered the intending parents constructive
genetic contribution; or (b) the fact of the intending parents' marriage
acts as a suitable substitute for any genetic contribution. Either of
these readings is plausible.
First, consistent with Buzzanca, it is arguable that the UPA is not
so concerned that there be a biological connection between the child
and the intending parents as long as there is a tie between genetic and
gestational contenders for parenthood that is then broken by
intention."'S The UPA, in contrast to surrogacy statutes but
consistently with Buzzanca, considers that tie to be established not
necessarily by direct genetic contribution by the intending parents
themselves but by their arranging for third-party contributions of
genetic material. This approach would allow a couple, both of whom
are infertile, to have children by assisted conception, an opportunity
unavailable under the terms of existing state statutes. Under the
second reading, the UPA may merely be extending the notion,
embodied in the state statutes-and in at least one state court
315. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 801 cmt., 9B U.L.A. 363 (2001).
316. Under Florida law, this is possible only pursuant to a pre-planned adoption
arrangement which allows the gestational mother to revoke her consent to place the child
for adoption within seven days of the birth of the child. See FLA. STAT. ch. 63.212(i)(1)(b)
(Harrison 2001). Arkansas appears to permit a single woman to become a mother via
surrogacy without contributing her own egg, but the language of the statute makes this
difficult to verify. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201(b)(3) (Michie 1998) ("[T]he child shall
be that of... [t]he woman intended to be the mother in cases of a surrogate mother when
an anonymous donor's sperm was utilized for artificial insemination.").
317. Like some surrogacy statutues, the new UPA permits intending parents to enter
enforceable surrogacy arrangements only where the wife is incapable of gestating a child.
See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 803(b)(2), 9B U.L.A. 364 (2001); see also Table 2, infra.
The policy behind this requirement is to prevent a couple from choosing surrogacy merely
"to avoid the inconvenience of a pregnancy." UNIF. PARENTAGE AT § 803 cmt., 9B
U.L.A. 365 (2001).
318. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT art. 8 cmt., 9B U.L.A. 361 (2001) ("The practice of
having a woman perform both functions is generally strongly disfavored by the assisted
reproduction community. Experience has shown that the gestational mother's link to the
child sometimes creates additional emotional and psychological problems in enforcing a
gestational agreement.").
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decision319-that parenthood by pure intention is appropriate only
where marriage can serve as a proxy for genetic contribution. Under
this reading, parenthood by pure intention is a significant enough
departure from traditional parentage principles that the source of the
intending parents' genetic contribution is irrelevant as long as they
are married to each other and can achieve pre-conception judicial
validation of their surrogacy agreement.
A review of the statutes and proposed legislation leads to
questions about the rights of unmarried individuals and single people
to resort to assisted reproduction without the necessity of having to
make a direct genetic contribution to the arrangement. While
assuredly compelling, Shultz's and Hill's proposals to recognize
intentional parenthood offer insufficient bases from which to launch a
reform effort to expand existing regimes restricting the privilege of
parenthood by pure intention to married couples. Most important,
these proposals, although they mention the promise of legal
recognition for nontraditional families,320 focus more squarely on the
question of which parent should be chosen from among various
contenders rather than on whether unmarried persons should be able
to avail themselves of the status of parents by pure intention.32' In
raising the claims of nontraditional parents merely as a means of
underscoring the importance of intentional parenthood generally.'
these proposals give the legal system, committed as it is to the idea
that rational distinctions drawn between married couples and
unmarried individuals do not offend equal protection guarantees,
323
little footing upon which to extend the privilege of parenthood by
pure intention to nontraditional families.
319. See Doe v. Doe, 710 A.2d 1297, 1337 (Conn. 1998) (Katz, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (suggesting that the privilege of intentional parenthood ought not be
operative outside the context of marriage).
320. See Shultz, supra note 17, at 346,396.
321. See Hill, supra note 17, at 414-18 (arguing that intending parents "should trump
the relatively weaker claims of either the gestational host or the biological progenitors");
Schultz, supra note 16, at 323 ("I argue for a new meta-rule that makes bargained-for
intentions determinative of legal parenthood.").
322. See id at 341-46 (examining how intentional parenthood would function in both
marital and nonmarital families).
323. See Storrow, supra note 8.
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Table 2: Statutory Regulation of Surrogacy
Surrogate Intending One Surrogacy
must be mother must intending model
married, lack capacity parent must contemplated
to gestate. be genetic
parent.



























No No Yes Gestational












Yes Yes Yes Gestational or
Traditional
No Yes No Gestational or
Traditional
B. Unwed Fathers And Functional Families
In some respects, the struggle of unmarried persons to become
parents by pure intention recalls the obstacles faced by unwed
biological fathers who claim a right to a declaration of their paternity.
The United States Supreme Court visited this question in several
cases during the 1970s and '80s. 4  Like the hypothetical case of
324. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246
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unwed intentional parents, these cases pose the question whether a
biological but unwed father has a right to recognition of his paternity
for the purposes of blocking an adoption consented to by the
mother.32 In general, the court held that if such a father does not
marry the mother of his children, he must function as a parent toward
them if he is to be entitled to an adjudication of his claim. 6 An
examination of these cases underscores the role that marriage plays in
statutes that allow for the assignment of parenthood based on
intention alone.
In Stanley v. Illinois,32 the first of these cases, Joan and Peter
Stanley, although they never married, lived together with their
children. When Joan died, the State of Illinois, enforcing a statute
providing that "the children of unwed fathers become wards of the
State upon the death of the mother,"3 removed the children from
Peter and placed them in foster care. No such provision applied to
unwed mothers or married fathers; they were presumed fit to raise
their children329 and could not be deprived of them absent a showing,
in a neglect proceeding, of their unfitness. Peter appealed from the
dependency proceeding, claiming a violation of equal protection.33°
Having achieved no success in the state courts, he brought his case to
the United States Supreme Court. The Court reversed the adverse
state court decisions, concluding that Peter had been deprived of due
process, since "all Illinois parents are constitutionally entitled to a
hearing on their fitness before their children are removed from their
custody." 33' In addition, the Court found a clear equal protection
violation in this case: denying Peter a hearing simply on the basis of
his status as an unwed father was impermissible differential treatment
from "other parents whose custody of their children is
challenged ....
In the course of its analysis, the Court extolled the importance of
the family whether or not legitimized by marriage,333 and described as
one of its components "the interest of a parent in the companionship,
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
325. See DOLGIN, DEFINING THE FAMILY, supra note 23, at 98; KRAUSE ET AL., supra
note 238, at 319.
326. See DOLGIN, DEFINING THE FAMILY, supra note 23, at 99,119.
327. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
328. IaL at 646.
329. See id- at 647.
330. See iL
331. Id at 658.
332. I&
333. See id at 651.
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care, custody, and management of his or her children."3 4 Criticizing
the state's categorical definition of all unwed fathers as unfit parents,
the Court declared Illinois' summary dependency procedure
insufficiently narrowly tailored to achieve what they felt without
question was a compelling goal.35 To ensure the best interests of the
child in every case, the Court declared it was not necessary
categorically to define all unwed fathers as unfit parents.336
The dissent, using language later adopted in decisions that
followed Stanley, looked at the case from a different angle. Deciding
that the jurisdiction of the Court was limited to evaluating the equal
protection claim, the dissent explained how on that basis the Illinois
dependency proceeding scheme passed constitutional muster. It was
perfectly reasonable, according to the dissent, for Illinois to accord
unwed fathers differential treatment: having not entered into the
marriage contract, a sign of willingness "to work together towards the
common end of child rearing '' 337 and to assume "legally enforceable
rights and duties, 3  towards their children, and, moreover, not being
"identifiable as the mother"339 but instead very often being absent
from the birth and uninterested in child rearing,m an unwed father
could be required by the State to "ask for custody."34 In this way, the
dissent believed the Illinois statutory scheme permissibly restricted an
unwed father from achieving the status of a parent only if he failed to
submit to "a formal proceeding comparable to the marriage
ceremony." 2
The majority and the dissent were clearly at cross purposes in
Stanley. The dissent focused most forcefully on the lack of legal proof
of Peter's paternity and how, without a legal adjudication of this
paternity, there was no way for the State to verify that there was a
"living adult with ... legally enforceable obligation[s] for the care and
support of the infant children."343 The majority, on the other hand,
implicitly found this emphasis on advance assurances that unwed
fathers have assumed legally enforceable obligations with respect to
their children irrelevant given that there was no issue of Peter's
334. Id.
335. See id. at 652, 654-55, 657-58.
336. See id. at 656-57.
337. Id. at 661 n.1 (Burger, J., dissenting).
338. Id. at 663 (Burger, J., dissenting).
339. Id. at 663, 665 (Burger, J., dissenting).
340. See id. at 665-66 (Burger, J., dissenting).
341. Id. at 661 n.1 (Burger, J., dissenting).
342. Id.
343. Id. at 662 n.2 (Burger, J., dissenting).
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paternity in the case and that, in fact, as even the dissent freely
admitted, Peter had fully acknowledged his paternity and had
assumed responsibility for his children.'
The Stanley dissent's characterization of unwed fathers as largely
uninterested in the welfare of their children influenced the later
unwed-father cases that came before the Court. In Quilloin v.
Walcott4 5" Leon Quilloin opposed the petition for adoption of his
eleven-year-old child Darrell by Darrell's mother Ardell Walcott and
her new husband RandallY36 Quilloin and Walcott had never married
or lived together. 7 In his response to the Walcotts's petition,
Quilloin, who was subject to a child support obligation during the
years leading up to the adoption proceeding,3' sought not only to
block the adoption but to legitimate the child for inheritance
purposes and to secure visitation rights.' 9
Under Georgia law, a child born out of wedlock could be
adopted with the consent of the mother alone .3 ' For the unwed
father to have any standing to object to the adoption, Georgia law
required that he take affirmative steps to legitimate child."' In
contrast, a child born in wedlock could not be adopted without the
consent of both parents 2 Applying these statutes, the trial court
denied Quilloin standing to object to the adoption and also rejected
his constitutional claims.353 The court likewise decided that it was in
the best interest of Darrell to be adopted by Mr. Walcott and for
Quilloin not to be allowed to legitimate Darrell or to have visitation
rights.3 4 The trial court based this decision primarily on Quilloin's
mere sporadic support of Darrell,355 his having had a "disruptive
effect" on Ardell Walcott's new family,356 and Walcott's having
married and having assumed custody of Darrell since his birth. 7
Quilloin appealed his challenge of the statutes on constitutional
grounds, but the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed, noting the state's
344. See id. at 662. (Burger, J., dissenting).
345. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
346. See id. at 248.
347. See id.
348. See id. at 251 n.9, 256.
349. See id at 247.
350. See id. at 248.
351. See id. at 249.
352. See id.
353. See id. at 251-52.
354. See id.




"policy of rearing children in a family setting 358 and emphasizing that
Quilloin had never been a part of Darrell's family unit, defined by
Walcott's marriage to Randall.3 9 On appeal to the United States
Supreme Court, Quilloin launched equal protection and due process
claims arguing "he was entitled to an absolute veto over adoption of
his child, absent a finding of his unfitness as a parent"36 and that
Georgia's statutory scheme treated him differently from married
fathers. 6'
Praising parenthood and "natural families," '362 the Court
distinguished Quilloin from the attentive father in Stanley and
decided that the state's interest in validating the Walcott family by
allowing the adoption of Darrell to take place significantly
outweighed Quilloin's interest in being recognized as Darrell's father
for the purpose of objecting to his adoption by Randall Walcott.
Absent a showing that an unwed father ever had custody, as was
shown in Stanley, or that "the proposed adoption would place the
child with a new set of parents with whom the child had never before
lived," the court found it untenable that someone in Quilloin's
position had to be guaranteed an inquiry into his unfitness for
parenthood before the adoption would be permitted.364 To make such
a demand, the Court implied, was the height of selfishness: after all,
everyone but Quilloin, including Darrell, wanted the adoption to
proceed.6
With regard to Quilloin's equal protection challenge, the Court
readily found compelling distinctions between Quilloin and married
fathers, even fathers separated or divorced from their children's
mothers, to justify affording him "less veto authority. ''366 Although
Quilloin was under a child support obligation for the years prior to
the adoption proceeding, he never did perform the duties incident to
assuming actual or legal custody of a child, namely, duties regarding
"daily supervision, education, protection, or care of the child."367 This
contrasted significantly, in the Court's mind, with a married father
358. Id. at 252.
359. See id. at 252-53.
360. Id. at 253.
361. See id.




366. Id at 256.
367. Id.
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who had, by virtue of his marriage, "borne full responsibility for the
rearing of his children," even if the marriage ultimately failed.3 6
Quilloin is a curious decision on many counts, including its
seeming inattention to rigorous constitutional analysis. Particularly
blatant is the Court's distinction of married fathers from unwed
fathers based on unsupported presumptions about the relationship of
marriage to childrearing. Citing no authority, the Court presumed
that married fathers, even ones who later divorce the mothers of their
children, have shouldered not only the responsibility of supporting
their children financially but of performing daily supervision and care
during the period of the marriage 9 This presumption recalls the
presumption underlying the statute struck down in Stanley that unwed
fathers have assumed no responsibility for their children, a
presumption which was expressly disapproved by the Court in that
case as any basis for establishing a regime of differential treatment for
fathers based on their marital status.' In Quilloin, though, Stanley
was but briefly mentioned and quickly distinguished.371 Instead of
following Stanley, Quilloin echoed and expanded upon the dissent in
Stanley in stating that "centuries of human experience" reveal the
weak bonds between unwed fathers and the children produced as a
result of their casual sexual encounters.3' But even though it
attempted not to align itself too completely with an analysis replete
with empty generalizations, the Court in Quilloin succeeded only in
sounding a shrill tone of arbitrariness.
Following Quilloin, the Supreme Court attempted to compensate
for its unconvincing reasoning in Caban v. Mohammed.373 In that
case, Abdiel Caban and Maria Mohammed never married but lived
together as a family unit for seven years." During this time, Maria
gave birth to two children, David and Denise." Caban and
Mohammed then separated, and Mohammed retained custody of the
children. 6 Both parties subsequently married others." but Caban
368. 1&
369. See id.
370. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972).
371. See Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 247-48; CLARK, supra note 237, § 20.2, at 858
(commenting that Quilloin's ignoring Stanley is "inexplicable").
372- See Stanley, 405 U.S. at 665.
373. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).






kept in close contact with his children.' In a dispute over custody of
the children, Mohammed and her husband Kazim were awarded
custody, and Caban and his wife were allowed visitation."
Subsequent to these events, the Mohammeds petitioned to adopt the
children. The Cabans cross-petitioned to adopt them, but
Mohammed withheld her consent."' Under New York law, this
effectively blocked the Caban's adoption petition?" Based on this
law, and on its assessment that the Mohammeds were qualified to be
parents and that adoption by them was in the children's best interests,
the family court approved the Mohammeds' adoption petition.
In the Supreme Court, Caban challenged the New York law on
constitutional grounds, claiming that its differential treatment of
unmarried mothers and unmarried fathers violated equal protection
principles.3' Echoing one of Leon Quilloin's claims, Caban also
challenged the law's denial of his due process right to "maintain a
parental relationship with [his] children absent a finding that [he was]
unfit as [a parent]."'4
Emphasizing the law's grant of veto power to the mother of a
nonmarital child but its denial of similar power to the father of such a
child, ' 5 the Court applied the substantial relationship test required of
gender-based distinctions,386 and concluded that, although there might
be significant differences between the relationship a child has with his
mother and that which he has with his father when the child is an
infant, there was no support either in the record or generally to
suggest that as a child matures the maternal relationship remains of
greater importance than the paternal." Thus disapproving of the
notion that "some universal difference between maternal and
paternal relations [exists] at every phase of a child's development,"
the Court rejected as irrelevant the state's argument that it could
more efficiently promote adoptions of nonmarital children if the
378. See id at 383.
379. See iL
380. See id. at 383-84.
381. See id. at 384.
382. See id.
383. See id. at 385.
384. Id.
385. See id. at 386-87.
386. See id. (citing Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)).
387. See id. at 400. Notably, the Court did not analyze the question whether the
distinction made in the statute between married and unmarried fathers was also
unconstitutional. See id. at 394 n.16.
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objections of unwed fathers did not have to be considered.3"
According to the Court, the state could more appropriately
encourage adoptions of nonmarital children by more carefully
distinguishing between a father who "never has come forward to
participate in the rearing of his child"3' 9 and a father who has
significant involvement with his child.3" The unacceptable
arbitrariness of the law thus lay in its grounding in "'overbroad
generalizations,.' 39' the bane of gender-based classifications when
viewed through the lens of equal protection.
392
Four justices dissented in Caban, their remarks focusing most
directly on "promoting the welfare of illegitimate children"393 by
making them "legitimate" through adoption. Granting veto power to
only one biological parent in such cases, the dissent felt, would
promote such adoptions3 94 By thus emphasizing the best interests of
children, it was easy for the dissenting justices to see their way to
depriving unwed fathers of rights guaranteed to married fathers and
unwed mothers. According to the dissent, even unwed fathers like
Caban who have ongoing relationships with their children are due
only standing to be heard during the best interests phase of the
adoption hearing.39 For the dissent, "the absence of a legal tie with
the mother" was determinative of the entitlement of unwed fathers to
fewer constitutional protections in this context:
Parental rights do not spring full-blown from the biological
connection between parent and child. They require relationships
more enduring. The mother carries and bears the child, and in this
sense her parental relationship is clear. The validity of the father's
parental claims must be gauged by other measures. By tradition,
the primary measure has been the legitimate familial relationship
he creates with the child by marriage with the mother.3 6
388. Id. at 389-90. New York likewise argued that marriage would be thwarted by
granting the unwed father a veto power, since the mothers' new husbands would think
twice about marrying them if they discovered they could not adopt the mothers' children.
See id. at 390-91.
389. Id at 392.
390. See id. at 393.
391. Id. at 394 (quoting Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 211 (1977); Stanton v.
Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14-15 (1975)).
392. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515,533 (1996).
393. Caban, 441 U.S. at 395 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
394. See id at 400 (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("If the consent of both unwed parents were
required, and one withheld that consent, the illegitimate child would remain
illegitimate.").
395. See id. at 396 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
396. Id. at 397 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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The dissent in Caban sought to establish more of a bright-line
rule in the rights-of-unwed-father cases than did the majority. In
contrast to the result reached by the majority (in which searching
analyses of the facts would be required in every case), the Caban
dissent would offer equivalent constitutional protection only to
fathers who marry the mothers of their children: "[b]y definition, the
question before us can arise only when no such marriage has taken
place."3  Although the dissent approved of Stanley only insofar as
the stark presumption of unfitness in that case afforded an unwed
father no right to be heard before his children were removed from
him, it nonetheless felt that Caban's failure to marry Mohammed cast
him amongst the majority of unwed fathers who are "simply
uninterested" in their children. 9 Additionally, since most adoptions
are of infants or very young children3 9 and thus since their mothers
are likely to be caring for them at the time of their adoption , "a rule
that gives the mother of the newborn infant the exclusive right to
consent to its adoption" is justified.4°' These factors rendered the
dissent unprepared to define whatever differential treatment Caban
received in this case as constitutionally infirm.4
Though, having made up for its unsatisfactory analysis in
Quilloin, the Supreme Court nonetheless granted certiorari to hear
the fourth in this line of cases. In Lehr v. Robertson, 3 Lorraine
Robertson married Richard Robertson eight months after giving birth
to Jonathan Lehr's child Jessica.' Although Lorraine never denied
that Lehr was Jessica's father,405 and in fact represented that he was,"'
Lehr was not the presumed father of the child, had not been
adjudicated the father, and did not enter his name in the state's
putative father registry. Given these circumstances, and although
Lehr had made efforts to visit Jessica and to support her financially,4 3
when Jessica was over two years old and Lorraine and her new
husband petitioned to adopt her, Lehr did not receive notice of their
397. Id.
398. Id. at 398 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
399. See id. at 404 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
400. See id. at 405 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
401. Id. at 407 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
402. See idL at 394-95 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
403. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
404. See id. at 250.
405. See id. at 268 n.1 (White, J.,dissenting).
406. See id. at 269 (White, J., dissenting).
407. See id. at 251.
408. See id- at 269 (White, J., dissenting).
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petition.4' One month later, Lehr filed a paternity petition in another
county.410  When he attempted to stay the adoption proceeding
pending the determination of the paternity petition, he was informed
that the adoption had already been finalized.41 ' He then petitioned to
vacate the order of adoption "on the ground that it was obtained by
fraud and in violation of his constitutional rights., 412 This petition was
denied, and both the Appellate Division and the New York Court of
Appeals affirmed.4 3
Lehr's constitutional challenge to the New York statutory
scheme claimed that its failure to guarantee him proper notice of the
adoption proceeding deprived him of his liberty interest, without due
process of law, in a relationship with his child41 4 Lehr also brought an
equal protection claim, charging differential treatment based on
gender.415  In a lengthy opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed the
lower courts' decisions. In assessing Lehr's due process claim, the
Court considered Stanley, Quilloin, and Caban.46 The Court, relying
heavily on Justice Stewart's dissent in Caban, declared that the
existence of an unwed father's liberty interest in maintaining a
relationship with his biological child depends on his assumption of an
"actual relationship of parental responsibility., 417 The Court observed
that, although marriage to the child's mother guarantees an unwed
father the liberty "to maintain his or her parental relationship, 4 8 in
the absence of marriage, such a liberty exists only in the context of
"the father's actual relationship with the children., 419 Having neither
married Mildred nor maintained a relationship with his daughter
Jessica, and having not taken advantage of New York's
comprehensive statutory scheme established to protect his interests,42
the Court considered Lehr, as distinguished from Peter Stanley and
Caban,42' to possess no substantive due process right to maintain a
parental relationship with his child.4' This was especially true in light
409. See idL at 250-51.
410. See id. at 252.
411. See id. at 253.
412. Id
413. See id. at 253-54.
414. See iL at 255.
415. See idl
416. See id. at 258-61.
417. Id- at 260.
418. Id.
419. I& at 260 n.16.
420. See id. at 263.
421. See id. at 261.
422- See id. at 263.
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of the fact that, as did Darrell's adoption in Quilloin, Jessica's
adoption by the Robertsons had the effect of giving "'full recognition
to a family unit already in existence .... ""'
The Court asserted Lehr's equal protection claim could only
succeed where there is true similarity of situation between the classes
receiving differential treatment.4  The Court felt this could not be
said to be the case where one of the parents, Quilloin or Lehr for





with his child. Although the Caban court visited this very same issue,
the Lehr court implied that Caban was not retroactive. 426
Nonetheless, the Lehr court distinguished Caban in its evaluation of
Lehr's equal protection claim. w
Three justices dissented in Lehr, finding a due process violation
in the state's failure to notify Lehr where it had "actual notice of his
existence, whereabouts, and interest in the child."4' The dissent
objected strenuously to the majority's selective use of facts and, on
the basis of these facts, its assessment that Lehr had no liberty interest
in a relationship with his child; moreover, the dissent objected to the
majority's failure to recognize that Lehr's biological parenthood per
se entitled him to notice, regardless of the quality of his relationship
with Jessica.429 Finally, the dissent decried the sheer formalism of
presuming Lehr to have abandoned Jessica when he had
unequivocally made his claim to paternity known by filing a paternity
action.3
Professor Dolgin sees a development in the position the Court
assumed in the unwed father cases from one grounded in the notion
that "fathers become fathers because they establish relationships with
their children" and one based on the ideologically more conservative
notion that "fathers become fathers because they are connected to
the mothers of their children., 4 ' Dolgin writes: "the fathers in
423. I& at 263 n.19 (quoting Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246,255 (1978)).
424. See id. at 267.
425. d. at 267-68 (citations omitted).
426. See id. at 254,255 n.8.
427. See id. at 267.
428. Id. at 268.
429. See id. at 272.
430. See id. at 275.
431. See DOLGIN, DEFINING THE FAMILY, supra note 23, at 98. Professor Carbone
describes these two positions as presenting "the two faces of responsible fathering: either
the ability to create, in one form or another, a 'unitary family' that unites mom and dad in
complementary roles or a father's ability to perform the essential attributes of mothering
and fathering himself." Carbone, supra note 275, at 175.
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Stanley and Caban effected relations that adequately resembled
families with the children's mothers and the fathers in Quilloin and
Lehr did not."432 Dolgin's examination of the United States Supreme
Court's unwed father cases has direct bearing on the question of
whether the privilege of parenthood by pure intention should be
extended to the unmarried. While the issue undeniably has a
constitutional dimension, that topic has been ably discussed by
others.433 The following discussion instead focuses on the parallels
between the unwed-father decisions and determinations of parentage
made in the context of assisted reproduction.
One salient parallel is between Stanley and Buzzanca. Peter
Stanley objected to being compelled by the state to adopt his own
children or to petition for legal custody of them after their mother's
death.4 This recalls Luanne Buzzanca's claim that her maternity
should be recognized simply by virtue of her having set in motion the
events which brought about the birth of the child and without resort
to an adoption proceeding initiated after the child's birth in which
Luanne's parental fitness would be assessed.435 The lower courts in
both cases were remarkably resistant to any expansion of the
definition of presumed legal parenthood to include unwed fathers or
intentional mothers and, as a result of this resistance, approved, in
Buzzanca, of labelling the child a legal orphan43 6 and, in Stanley, of
summarily removing the children from the father they had known and
placing them in the custody of others.437 To these courts, neither
Buzzanca nor Stanley qualified for parenthood without formalized
adjudication because neither possessed acceptable factual indicia of
that status.
Without being distracted by the circularity of this argument, it is
important to recognize the emphasis it places on the relationship
between marriage and biological connection in the assignment of
parentage. For the lower courts, despite his genetic relationship with
his children, Stanley had no entitlement to parentage because he was
unmarried.4" Similarly, Buzzanca had no entitlement to parentage
because, though married, she had no biological connection with
432. Id. at 110.
433. See generally ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE, supra note 4, at 143-44.
434. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 647-49 (1972).
435. See Buzzanca v. Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 289 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998)
(criticizing adoption model of surrogacy).
436. See id. at 282.
437. See Stanley, 405 U.S. at 646.
438. See id. at 646-47.
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Jaycee.439 Had Stanley been married, the presumption of his paternity
would have attached fully apart from his genetic relationship with his
children.44°  Had Buzzanca been Jaycee's genetic or gestational
mother, she would have had a cognizable claim to motherhood fully
apart from the fact of her marriage. 441 In neither case would both a
genetic tie and marriage have been required. And yet, this is
precisely the scheme that the state statutes embody.442 Seen in this
light, intended parenthood under existing statutes seems less like a
new type of parenthood than like a codification of the traditional
biological-connection and marital-presumption indicia of parentage,
leaving intention little role to play if either spouse lacks both of these
indicia.
The UPA, discarding the genetic relatedness factor,443
nonetheless requires intentional parents to be married.' This would
suggest that marriage is essential as a prerequisite to claiming the
privilege of parenthood by pure intention but that genetic relatedness
is not. This departure from the terms of existing statutes can be
understood in one of two ways. First, the arrangement of the
intending parents for the genetic contribution by third-party donors
may be considered the intending parents' constructive genetic
contribution. To pursue this legal fiction a little further would be to
consider the surrogate the wife's agent for gestation. The resulting
child would be a child of the marriage, and the wife's husband would
thus benefit from the marital presumption of paternity. In short, the
lack of a genetic contribution requirement in the UPA might simply
be a recognition of the fact that, looked at in just the right way, a
surrogacy arrangement to which neither member of a married couple
contributes genetic material is very similar to the case of a married
couple who creates a child via coitus. Read in these terms, the UPA
resembles existing statutes in that it does not create a truly new type
of parenthood."5 Unlike the statutes, however, the UPA achieves the
439. See Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 282 ("[Luanne] could not be the mother because
she had neither contributed the egg nor given birth.").
440. See CLARK, supra note 237, § 4.4 at 191 (discussing presumption of legitimacy of
child born to married woman).
441. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 779 (Cal 1993) ("[W]e conclude that
presentation of blood test evidence is one means of establishing maternity, as is proof of
having given birth .... ).
442. See supra notes 294-300 and accompanying text.
443. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT art. 8 cmt., 9B U.L.A. 361 (2001).
444. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 801(b), 9B U.L.A. 362 (2001).
445. See Garrison, Interpretive Approach, supra note 15, at 874, 880-81; Garrison,
Technological Family, supra note 23, at 691.
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particularly humane result of allowing a couple, both of whom are
infertile, to become parents via a judicially validated expression of
their intentions.
The second possible reading of the UPA is that it simply discards
the genetic relatedness requirement and makes marriage a
prerequisite to intentional parentage because marriage is a suitable
substitute for any genetic relationship a married couple might have
with their child. In this way, marriage serves as a proxy for parental
responsibility fully apart from any genetic connection. This reading
presents intentional parentage as a type of parentage that has not
been recognized before. 6 Recognizing that intentional parenthood is
446. The closest analogy is adoption. See Garrison, Interpretive Approach, supra note
15, at 907 (explaining that adoption agencies favor married couples and "allow[ single-
parent adoptions only in the case of hard-to-place children .... ); Shultz, supra note 17, at
319-21. But see Garrison, Interpretive Approach, supra note 15, at 861 ("Even in cases of
adoption ... intentions are insufficient to effect a rights transfer; a showing of compliance
with other state requirements designed to protect the child's and parties' interests must
also be made.").
Although the requirement that a surrogacy agreement be judicially validated pre-
conception appears to force the parties into an adoption-like posture in order to effect the
terms of the agreement, it should be noted that the process is only "roughly analogous to
adoption procedures," UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 803 cmt., 9B U.L.A. 364 (2001), in
requiring "the intended parents [to] meet the standards of fitness applicable to adoptive
parents," UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 803(b)(3), 9B U.L.A. 364 (2001). Unlike adoption
provisions, if this requirement is waived, no evaluation of the intending parent takes place.
Cf UNIF. ADOPTION AC § 2-201(b), 9 U.L.A. 40 (1999) ("A court may excuse the
absence of a preplacement evaluation for good cause shown, but the prospective adoptive
parent so excused must be evaluated during the pendency of the proceeding for
adoption."). This gestational agreement can nonetheless be validated, and, if it is, "the
court must declare that the intended parents will be the parents of any child born pursuant
to, and during the term of, the agreement." UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 803 cmt., 9B
U.L.A. 365 (2001) (emphasis added). This declaration vests parentage in the intended
parents, and, after the birth of the child, the court merely "confirm[s] that the intended
parents are the parents of the child." UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 807(a)(1) CMT., 9B
U.L.A. 368 (2001). These provisions contrast sharply with adoption provisions which
allow a parent to revoke her consent to the adoption of her child or her relinquishment of
her child to an agency for the purposes of adoption within a certain amount of time after
the birth of the child, see UNIF. ADOPTION ACT §§ 2-408(a)(1), 2-409(a)(1), 9 U.L.A. 60,
62 (1999), and make the parent and child relationship of the adoptive parent and the
adoptee contingent upon termination, after the child's birth, of the parent and child
relationship of the consenting or relinquishing parent and her child, see UNIF. ADOPTION
ACT §§ 1-104, 3-505(1), 9 U.L.A. 23, 89-90 (2001). Only if a gestational agreement is not
validated by the court does full resort to adoption provisions become necessary to carry
out its terms. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 809 cmt., 9B U.L.A. 369 (2001). These
salient differences between gestational agreements and adoption are underscored by
Commissioner Harry Tindall's comment during the floor debate on the UPA's limitation
of gestational agreements to married couples that "[w]e're not into adoption law in this
act." Uniform Parentage Act (2000) (with Unofficial Annotations by John J. Sampson,
Reporter), 35 FAM. L. Q. 83,204 (2001).
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a significant departure from traditional parentage principles, this
reading takes the position that for this reason intentional parenthood
should be reserved to married couples."7
No matter which reading of the UPA is undertaken, under its
terms, unmarried couples and singles cannot choose to become
parents by intention alone. In the search for an analytical framework
that would suggest an entitlement on the part of unmarried
individuals to the privileges of intentional parenthood, it bears noting
that, with intention having replaced genetics as the indicium of
parentage, the role of marriage in the second reading of the UPA
provisions remains unclear. It is true that surrogacy agreements are
"controversial" and that "the plight of childless married couples" is
disconcerting.48 But the childlessness of those who wish to have
children, married or not, is uniformly disconcerting."9 Perhaps the
marriage requirement is meant to ensure that the intending parents
are very serious about their intentions and will be responsible for the
child."' It is not, however, clear that unmarried parents are not
serious about their offspring, although the fact that they are
unmarried may make their commitment a little more difficult to
discern.45 Statements to this effect in the unwed-father cases, if
applied in this context, suggest that unmarried couples may labor
under a presumption that they will shirk their responsibility to
provide for their intended child.452
There are at least two arguments to be made in favor of
recognizing the parentage of unmarried intending parents. One is
that if marriage is a requirement so as to guarantee a support
obligation, then the unmarried are on equal footing with the married,
because they are similarly legally obligated to support their children.
Second, intent to rear a child constitutes an element of parental
functioning that entitles unmarried intending parents to recognition
of their parentage.
447. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 801 cmt., 9B U.L.A. 362-63 (2001) (noting the
"controversial nature of these agreements").
448. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 801 cmt., 9B U.L.A. 363 (2001).
449. See Garrison, Interpretive Approach, supra note 15, at 910 (acknowledging with
pathos single women "who deeply want a child").
450. See Shultz, supra note 17, at 342 ("Entry into legal marriage... signal[s]
commitment sufficient to ground parenting responsibilities").
451. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 661 n.1 (1972). (Burger, C.J., dissenting)
(noting "no legally cognizable signification of willingness" from unwed parents to accept
responsibility for child).
452. See id.; Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 256 (1978); Caban v. Mohammed, 441
U.S. 380, 397 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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The concern that unmarried intending parents will not be fully
bound to support the child they wish to rear is unfounded, because
intentional parenthood guarantees a support obligation. To qualify at
all for intentional parenthood, intending parents must embody their
intentions in a written document, and, under the UPA and in some
states, must submit this document to the court for judicial pre-
approval.453 If they fail to do so, the document is enforceable
according to traditional parentage and adoption principles4" or is
unenforceable.455 Nonetheless, the intending parents may still be
liable for support if they refuse to adopt the child.456 Moreover, if the
intending parents fail to comply with the terms of the agreement,
their obligation to support the child is unaffected.457 Thus, even if an
individual intending parent's intentions toward the child changed, he
would not be relieved of his support obligation. Similar obligation
attaches if the marriage of the intending parents ends in separation or
divorce.45 In short, both married and unmarried intending parents
have "borne full [parental] responsibility"4 in "an actual relationship
of parental responsibility,"' 6 entitling them to recognition of their
parentage. The concern that a child might be left without a claim to
the resources of a private individual, as was threatened by the trial
court's decision in Buzzanca, is non-existent in the context of
parenthood by pure intention, and so an intending parent, even an
unmarried one, cannot be likened to with a parent who presumptively
453. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 801(a), 9B U.L.A. 362 (2001) (providing that
agreement must be in writing); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 803, 9B U.L.A. 364 (2001)
(explaining requirements for judicial pre-approval of gestational agreement); FLA. STAT.
ANN. ch. 63.212(1)(i) (West Supp. 2001) (providing for review by the court of pre-planned
adoption arrangements and requiring filing of petition in connection with pre-planned
adoption agreement); FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 63.212(1)(i)(2) (West Supp. 2001) (outlining
required terms of pre-planned adoption agreement); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:21, §
168-B:25 (1994) (laying out judicial preauthorization provisions and mandatory signed
surrogacy contract terms); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-159 (Michie 2000) (providing for validity
of written surrogacy contracts); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160 (Michie 2000) (judicial
preauthorization provision).
454. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158(E), § 20-162 (Michie 2000).
455. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 809(a), 9B U.L.A. 369 (2001).
456. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT art. 8 cmt., 9B U.L.A. 361 (2001) ("[I]ndividuals who
enter into nonvalidated gestational agreements and later refuse to adopt the resulting
child may be liable for support of the child."); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 809(c), 9B
U.L.A. 369 (2001).
457. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:8(IV) (1994) ("A breach of a surrogacy
contract by the intended parents shall not affect their support obligation.").
458. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158(C) (Michie 2000).
459. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246,256 (1978).
460. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248,260 (1983).
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shirks responsibility for her child.461 If marriage is a suitable proxy for
one's willingness to assume responsibility for a child,462 certainly the
pursuit of intentional parenthood status is no less suitable. In light of
these principles, marriage has no critical role to play in solidifying
support obligations under the UPA. While marriage does appear to
have an important role to play under traditional rules of parentage,
any role it might play in the intentional parenthood context seems
little more than redundant.
C. Reading Intent As Function
An analogy drawn by Shultz is relevant to the second argument
in favor of recognizing the intentional parenthood of unmarried
couples. Shultz compares the nature of the intention expressed by an
intending parent in a surrogacy agreement with the functional aspects
of fatherhood discussed in Supreme Court unwed-father cases....
Shultz highlights the analogy, without developing it in any detail, in
order to emphasize an aspect of the Baby M. case that could have
inspired the court to pursue greater gender parity in rendering that
decision.i64  The development of this analogy has important
ramifications for the second argument favoring intentional
parenthood for the unmarried, for it suggests a basis upon which an
intending parent might be recognized as a child's parent at the
moment of a child's birth, regardless of that parent's marital status.
What the unwed-father cases conclude, through their insistence
that marriage is a suitable proxy for "real, everyday ties that provide a
connection" between a child and his parents,465 is that marriage acts as
a substitute for functional parenting.4'6 The rule that a child born to a
marriage is the child of the spouses certainly has some appeal in that a
child born to a marriage is the responsibility of the spouses.467 This
461. See Shultz, supra note 17, at 376, 390 (contrasting fathers commissioning surrogate
births with unwed fathers who are uninterested in their children).
462. See Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 256.
463. See Shultz, supra note 17, at 391 (analogizing intentions embodied in surrogacy
agreements with "'developed relationship"' described in unwed-father cases); id at 323
(commenting that an intent to parent enhances the functional aspects of parenting). See
also Hurwitz, supra note 28, at 129 (defining intent to rear a child as a component of
functional motherhood).
464. See Shultz, supra note 17, at 392 (describing Baby M. as "lock[ing] in fathers' sex-
based lack of access to children" and "reinforc[ing] separate gendered spheres in the
world").
465. See Nguyen v. I.N.S., 533 U.S. 53 (2001).
466. See Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246,256 (1978).
467. See Levin v. Levin, 645 N.E.2d 601, 605 (Ind. 1994) (holding spouses have
obligation to support child of the marriage).
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doctrine seems particularly appealing where there may be some doubt
about the child's lineage, since it requires even non-biological fathers
to provide support for the child." The same policy ends would seem
to be met in the assisted reproduction context by merely altering the
bases upon which a child may be considered a child of the marriage,
that is, by requiring neither genetic nor gestational contribution to the
child but merely intent to raise her.69 Although the state statutes are
not yet prepared to take a step in this direction4 0 perhaps because it
is such a radical departure from traditional parentage law, the UPA
i.471is.
7
The thrust of the second argument is that intent should be an
element of parental functioning so as to entitle unmarried persons to
pursue parenthood by pure intention. The concept of functional
parenthood has been gaining increasing currency in American legal
scholarship and in the courts.47 Scholars and jurists have developed
this concept under various headings,473 among them functional
parent,474 de facto parent,475 in loco parentis,46 equitable estoppel,47
468. See id. (holding child conceived by heterologous artificial insemination a child of
the marriage).
469. See id. (child was child of the marriage where both spouses "were fully informed
and consented" to heterologous artificial insemination of wife).
470. See Table 2, supra.
471. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT art. 8 cmt., 9B U.L.A. 361 (2001) ("[T]he
restriction ... that at least one of the intended parents would be genetically related to the
child born of the gestational agreement has been eliminated.").
472. See, e.g., In re J.W.F., 799 P.2d 710, 715 n.4 (Utah 1990) (commenting that one's
relationship with a child may warrant standing to seek custody); see also OR. REV. STAT. §
109.119 (1989) (permitting award of custody, guardianship or visitation to one who has
"ongoing personal relationship" with a child).
473. See V.C. v. MJ.B., 725 A.2d 13, 32 n.14 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1999)
(Braithewaite, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (listing the terms that are often
used in this context as including psychological parent, in loco parentis, de facto
parenthood, equitable parenthood and functional parent), affd, 748 A.2d 539, 546 n.3
(N.J. 2000).
474. See Nancy D. Polikoff, The Deliberate Construction of Families Without Fathers: Is
It an Option for Lesbian and Heterosexual Mothers? 36 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 375, 387-
88 (1996) (quoting Amicus Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union, Thomas S. v.
Robin Y., 618 N.Y.S.2d 356 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (No. P3884/91)) (defining functional
parent) [hereinafter Polikoff, Deliberate Construction].
475. See Stitham v. Henderson, 768 A.2d 598, 605-06 (Me. 2001) (citing E.N.O. v.
L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 891 (Mass. 1999) (Saufley, J., concurring); AMERICAN LAW
INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.03(1)(c) (Tentative Draft No. 4, Apr. 10, 2000, adopted May 16,
2000) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES]); Burks, supra note 95, at 245.
476. See Burks, supra note 95, at 247.
477. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 475, at § 2.03(1)(b); Simmons v. Comer, 438 S.E.2d
530, 537 (W. Va. 1993); Thomas S., 618 N.Y.S.2d at 362 ("Having initiated and
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emotional or psychological parent, equitable parenthood,479 and
nonexclusive parenthood. 4"° All of these terms relate in some way or
another to the profile of the psychological parent described in
Goldstein, Freud and Solnit's Beyond the Best Interests of the Child:
A psychological parent is one who, on a continuing, day-to-day
basis, through interaction, companionship, interplay, and mutuality,
fulfills the child's psychological needs for a parent, as well as the
child's physical needs. The psychological parent may be a
biological.... adoptive, foster, or common-law ... parent, or any
other person.
There is no presumption in favor of any of these after the initial
assignment at birth ...
In a series of writings, Professor Nancy Polikoff has examined
numerous bases for expanding legal recognition of the family beyond
"a rigid definition of parenthood that often fails to recognize the
reality of children's actual relationships with parenting figures."'  In
This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood To Meet
the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Non-traditional
Families, Polikoff argues that "[a] new definition of parenthood is
necessary to adapt to the complexities of modem families." '  In
particular, Polikoff disapproves of legal rules that withhold
recognition from families not created by marriage, procreation or
adoption and that thus compromise the best interests of many
children whose families have been formed in other ways. In the
encouraged, over a substantial period of time, the relationship between petitioner and his
daughter, respondent is estopped to deny his right to legal recognition of that
relationship."); Burks, supra note 95, at 247.
478. See LaChapelle v. Mitten, 607 N.W.2d 151, 164 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000); Ettore I. v.
Angela D., 513 N.Y.S.2d 733,739 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987); V.C. v. MJ.B., 748 A.2d 539,546
n.3 (N.J. 2000) ("The terms psychological parent, de facto parent, and functional parent
are used interchangeably.... Psychological parent is the preferred term.").
479. See Atkinson v. Atkinson, 408 N.W.2d 516, 519, 520 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987)
(holding willingness of nonbiological father, among other things, entitled him to
recognition of his equitable parenthood); Burks, supra note 95, at 252.
480. See Burks, supra note 94, at 254.
481. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ANNA FREUD & ALBERT J. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST
INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 98 (2d ed. 1979). See Harris, supra note 95, at 461 n.1
(remarking that many functional parenthood theories are based on the definition of a
psychological parent).
482. David L. Chambers & Nancy D. Polikoff, Family Law and Gay and Lesbian
Family Issues in the Twentieth Century, 33 FAM. L.Q. 523,538 (1999).
483. Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood
To Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78
GEO. L.J. 459,471 (1990) [hereinafter Polikoff, Two Mothers].
484. See id. at 469, 482.
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course of her analysis, Polikoff defines a functional parent as "anyone
who maintains a relationship with a child when a legally recognized
parent fostered that relationship with the intent that the relationship
be parental in nature." ' Expanding on these concepts, Polikoff has
in her more recent scholarship worked through the legal details of
creating families headed by same-sex couples through the use of
contracts and theories of equitable parenthood.46 In forthcoming
work, she will advocate using contracts to fortify the rights of
intentional parents as against gamete donors or surrogates.
Polikoff's approach to achieving legal recognition for functional
parents differs from Professor Katharine Bartlett's. Bartlett
advocates use of the best interests of the child standard to allow non-
parents to gain certain rights with respect to children with whom they
have important relationships.' The reason why Bartlett is in favor of
legal recognition of functional parents is due to the high incidence of
caretaking that occurs outside the confines of the nuclear families
model.4 She theorizes that the failure of the law to recognize
functional parenthood is rooted in "the premise that parenthood is
exclusive." 9 This premise is most damaging, she writes, for its failure
to recognize a "child's need for continuity in intimate relationships." 4
Although neither makes the point directly, both Polikoff's and
Bartlett's accounts of functional parenthood are helpful in addressing
the concept that functional parenthood status may arise before legal
parents are identified, that is, prior to a child's birth, and that it thus
may serve as a basis for articulating a theory of parenthood by pure
intention.
Cases addressing functional parenthood illustrate that the idea
that an individual can achieve certain rights associated with
parenthood based on that individual's having functioned in a parent-
like role is common not only in cases of unwed fatherhood but in
cases in which a lesbian couple, one of whom is recognized as the
legal parent of a child either through blood or adoption, dissolve their
relationship. In such a case, the non-parent partner may seek either
485. Id at 464.
486. See Polikoff, Deliberate Construction, supra note 474; Nancy D. Polikoff, The
Social Construction of Parenthood in One Planned Lesbian Family, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 203 (1996).
487. See Bartlett, supra note 22, at 944-61, cited in Polikoff, Two Mothers, supra note
483, at 473 n.51. Cf. Hurwitz, supra note 28, at 168-79 (arguing that a best interests of the
child standard should drive the determination of legal maternity in surrogacy cases).




custody or visitation based on her having served as a functional or
psychological parent to the child."' In addressing this type of claim,
courts in California, Florida, Illinois, and New York have rejected the
concept of functional parenthood.4" Massachusetts and Rhode
Island, by contrast, have recognized functional parenthood in this
context.
493
In both Nancy S. and Alison D., a lesbian couple were raising
children who were biologically related to only one of the members of
the couple.494 In each of these cases, the couple's relationship had
lasted a number of years,495 and during it they had planned for and
carried out having children via artificial insemination.496 In each case,
one of the women was impregnated and bore the children.49 In
Nancy S., the children bore their non-biological mother's last name,
and she was listed on their birth certificates as their father.498  In
Alison D., the child bore his non-biological mother's name as his
middle name.49 In both cases, the women shared the responsibilities
of raising the children °° Not long after the unions dissolved, the
biological mother in each case asserted a right of parental autonomy
entitling her to bar her former partner from visiting the children."' In
Nancy S., the girl was at that time seven and one-half years of age and
the boy three and one-half.5' In Alison D., the boy was already six
years old.03 The California court rejected Nancy S.'s theory that she
491. See, e.g., E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 893 (Mass. 1999) (partner granted
visitation based on status as de facto parent); V.C. v. M.J.B, 748 A.2d 539, 555 (NJ. 2000)
(former partner satisfied psychological parent test entitling her not to custody but to
visitation); A.F. v. D.L.P., 771 A.2d 692, 699 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (former
partner could not meet test of psychological parenthood); see also Ruthann Robson,
Making Mothers: Lesbian Legal Theory & the Judicial Construction of Lesbian Mothers,
22 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 15, 23-24 (2000) (surveying jurisdictions).
492. See, e.g., Nancy S. v. Michele G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991); Curiale v.
Reagan, 272 Cal. Rptr. 520 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990); Kazmierazak v. Query, 736 So. 2d 106
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999); In re C.B.L., 723 N.E.2d 316 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999); Alison D. v.
Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991).
493. See, e.g., E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886 (Mass. 1999); Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759
A.2d 959 (R.I. 2000).
494. See Nancy S., 279 Cal. Rptr. at 214; Alison D., 572 N.E.2d at 28.
495. See Nancy S., 279 Cal. Rptr. at 214 (commenced 1969, dissolved 1985); Alison D..
572 N.E.2d at 28. (commenced 1977, dissolved 1983).
496. See Nancy S., 279 Cal. Rptr. at 214; Alison D., 572 N.E.2d at 28.
497. See Nancy S., 279 Cal. Rptr. at 214; Alison D., 572 N.E.2d at 28.
498. See Nancy S., 279 Cal. Rptr. at 214.
499. See Alison D., 572 N.E. 2d at 28.
500. See Nancy S., 279 Cal. Rptr. at 214; Alison D., 572 N.E.2d at 28.
501. See Nancy S., 279 Cal. Rptr. at 214; Alison D., 572 N.E.2d at 28.
502. See Nancy S., 279 Cal. Rptr. at 214.
503. See Alison D., 572 N.E.2d at 28.
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had parental rights arising from her de facto parenthood. °4 The New
York court dismissed Alison D.'s petition for visitation, because she
was not the boy's parent, and Virginia M. was not unfit*05
On appeal, both non-biological mothers were said to lack
standing to contest custody or to request visitation because they did
not meet the definition of a parent under the relevant statutes.
0 6
Although in Nancy S. the court discussed theories upon which non-
biological and non-adoptive parents obtain legal recognition as
parents,50 7 the court in Alison D. merely mentioned these theories
without explaining their substance."° Ultimately, these theories were
rejected by both courts as incapable of investing the petitioners in
these cases with the same rights as natural or adoptive parents.'
More recently, courts have responded more favorably to the
theories raised but not adopted in Nancy S. and Alison D. In E.N. 0.
v. L.M.M,510 factually similar to Nancy S. and Alison D., a committed
lesbian couple planned and prepared to have a child through artificial
insemination."' The boy born to the couple bore both of their last
names.512 At the time of their separation, the boy was three years
old. At that time, the boy's biological mother prevented E.N.O.
from seeing him.14 E.N.O. then sued for visitation and was granted
temporary visitation pending trial.55  The trial court found it
significant that the parties had jointly planned and prepared for the
birth of the child and that E.N.O. had acted as his parent, with the
result that the boy viewed her as such . 6 The trial court's order of
temporary visitation was reversed on appeal by the intermediate
appellate court, but the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
reinstated the trial court's order.1 7
The Supreme Judicial Court was of the opinion that, though no
specific statutory authority existed for the trial court's order, the
504. See Nancy S., 279 Cal. Rptr. at 214.
505. See Alison D., 572 N.E.2d at 29.
506. See Nancy S., 279 Cal. Rptr. at 214; Alison D., 572 N.E.2d at 29.
507. See Nancy S., 279 Cal. Rptr. at 216-19 (de facto parenthood, in loco parentis,
parenthood by equitable estoppel, functional parenthood).
508. See Alison D., 572 N.E.2d at 29 (de facto parenthood, parenthood by estoppel).
509. See Nancy S., 279 Cal. Rptr. at 216,217; Alison D., 572 N.E.2d at 29.
510. E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886 (Mass. 1999).
511. See id. at 888.
512. See id. at 889.
513. See id. at 888-89.
514. See id at 889.
515. Id.
516. Id
517. See id. at 888.
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order was proper as an exercise of that court's broad equity powers to
protect the best interests of children."8 In particular, the court
approved of considering "the child's nontraditional family" ' 9 and, in
support, cited sections of the American Law Institute's Principles on
the Law of Family Dissolution defining a de facto parent as "one who
has no biological relation to the child, but has participated in the
child's life as a member of the child's family. The de facto parent
resides with the child and, with the consent and encouragement of the
legal parent, performs a share of caretaking functions at least as great
as the legal parent.""52  In the course of its decision, the court
distinguished a precedent involving a failed claim of equitable
parenthood on the ground that that case did not involve a "decision
to create a family by bringing [a] child into the world."
521
Rubano v. DiCenzo5 " was a case of similar magnitude. In that
case, Maureen Rubano and Concetta DiCenzo were a committed
couple who planned and prepared to have a child via artificial
insemination.5' Eventually, DiCenzo gave birth to a baby boy whose
last name was listed on his birth certificate as "Rubano-DiCenzo."524
The couple then separated, and DiCenzo moved with the boy to
another state.' Although Rubano initially enjoyed visitation with
DiCenzo's consent, eventually tensions mounted to the point where
DiCenzo resisted Rubano's visits. 26 At that time, the boy was
approximately five years old .
Rubano sued to establish her de facto parenthood and court-
ordered visitation, and the parties reached a compromise permitting
Rubano to have visitation but requiring her to waive any claim to
parentage.5s In spite of the compromise, DiCenzo continued to
undermine Rubano's attempts to exercise her visitation rights. When
Rubano returned to court for relief, DiCenzo argued the court had
never possessed the jurisdiction necessary to issue the visitation order
518. See id. at 889-90.
519. Id. at 891.
520. Id. (citing AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY
DISSOLUTION § 2.03(1)(b) (Tentative Draft No. 3 Part I, 1998)).
521. Id. at 891 (citing C.M. v. P.R., 649 N.E.2d 154 (Mass. 1995)).
522. Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959 (R.I. 2000).





528. See id. at 962.
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in the first instance.29 The trial court certified the issues in the case to
the Rhode Island Supreme Court for resolution.'
The Rhode Island Supreme Court decided Rubano's visitation
claim was cognizable for three reasons. Although the committed
relationship Rubano and DiCenzo had shared did not qualify as a
"family relationship" regarding which the court had jurisdiction to
decide questions of equity, 3' Rubano qualified as an "interested
party" under a Rhode Island provision vesting the family court with
jurisdiction to determine "'the existence or nonexistence of a mother
and child relationship."' 32 In addition, Rubano could seek redress in
equity for DiCenzo's violation of the visitation ordered by the family
court.533 Finally, Rubano could petition the superior court given its
"original jurisdiction [to hear] suits and proceedings of an equitable
character."' ' Turning to DiCenzo's parental autonomy claims, the
court was of the opinion that a biological parent's autonomy, while
entitled to "special weight," may be insufficient to "prevent others
from acquiring parental rights vis-a-vis the child"535 and that, when
this happens, "the household of unmarried parents and their
children"536 deserves recognition.
Like E.N.O., Rubano relied on the American Law Institute's
(ALI) Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution.537 Chapter Two of
the Principles, for which Bartlett was a reporter, deals with child
custody.5- The Principles seek to accommodate today's wider
diversity of family norms and, while perhaps not explicitly adopting
Polikoff's proposal, nonetheless contain its spirit. In brief, the
Principles recognize not only legal parents but also parents by
estoppel and de facto parents-both species of functional parents.
Like Polikoff, the Principles give due regard to the autonomy of legal
parents, but prevent them, under certain circumstances, from raising
529. See icL at 962-63.
530. See idL at 963.
531. See icL at 964. The court found the family court's jurisdiction limited to such
matters of equity as arose from "petitions for divorce, bed and board and separate
maintenance." See id. at 965.
532. Id at 966 (quoting R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-8-26 (1956)).
533. See id. (citing R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-10-3(a) (1956)).
534. Id. at 972 (quoting R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-2-13 (1956)).
535. Id. at 974 (citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68 (2000)).
536. Id. at 973 (quoting Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123 n.3 (1989)).
537. See id. at 974-75 (citing PRINCIPLES, supra note 475); see also E.N.O. v. L.M.M.,
711 N.E.2d 886,891 (Mass. 1999) (citing AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OFTHE
LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Tentative Draft
No. 3, May 1998)).
538. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 475, at § 2.03, § 2.21.
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the evidentiary hurdle of proving unfitness against non-legal parents'
requests for custody or visitation. A parent by estoppel under the
Principles is not a legal parent but is someone who has "acted as a
parent under certain specified circumstances which serve to estop the
legal parent from denying the person's status as a parent." '539 The
specified circumstances under which one achieves this status include
A person who has lived with the child since birth, holding out and
accepting full and permanent responsibilities as a parent, as part of
a prior co-parenting agreement with the child's parent (or, if there
are two legal parents, both parents) to raise the child together with
full parental rights and responsibilities, when the court finds that
recognition is in the child's best interests .... "40
This particular method of achieving parent by estoppel status
"contemplates a situation in which two cohabiting adults-whether of
the same-sex or different-sex-set out to raise a child together fully
and permanently, and then perform those parenting functions. '" ' l An
example would be a lesbian couple who jointly decide to raise a child
together and arrange for one of them to conceive through artificial
insemination.42 These are the facts of Nancy S., Alison D., E.N.O.
and Rubano.
A de facto parent under the Principles is one who is neither a
legal parent nor a parent by estoppel.43 This parental status requires
the individual to have lived with the child for at least two yearse and
to have been allowed to co-parent by the child's legal parent 45 or to
have responded to the "complete failure or inability of any legal
parent to perform caretaking functions., 4 6 The de facto parent must
also have undertaken an equal or greater share of caretaking than did
the child's legal parent.47 Caretaking functions encompass parenting
functions and also include "tasks that involve interactions With the
child or that direct, arrange, and supervise the interaction and care
539. See id. at § 2.03(i)(a) cmt. b-i.
540. See id. at § 2.03(1)(b)(iii).
541. See id. at § 2.03(1)(b)(iii) cmt. b-iii. "Parenting functions" encompasses providing
economic support and maintaining the household. See id. at § 2.03(6).
542. See id. at § 2.03(1)(b)(iii) illus.
543. See id. at § 2.03(1)(c).
544. See id. at § 2.03(1)(c)(i).
545. This agreement requires "an affirmative act or acts by the legal parent that
demonstrates a willingness and an expectation of shared parenting responsibilities." See
id. at § 2.03(1)(c) cmt. c-iii.
546. See id at § 2.03(1)(c)(ii).
547. See id. at § 2.03(1)(c)(ii)(A)-(B).
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provided by others."'  These responsibilities cannot have been
undertaken primarily for financial compensation."
As in other cases where parental unfitness has been confirmed or
is irrelevant, the Principles take the position that where a de facto
parent has been identified, a best interests standard should apply in a
contest between the de facto and the natural or adoptive parent.
These developments have not been without their critics. At a recent
symposium on the Principles, several voices decried the de facto
parent and parenthood by estoppel provisions of Chapter Two,
Section Three, finding these provisions a subversion of the traditional
family.' Other critiques of functional parenthood have more
generally focused on the inherent incapacity of the case-by-case
approach required to assess it to achieve "parity between traditional
and non-traditional relationships .... "
The importance of the ALI's Principles lies in the opportunity it
affords to consider the legal basis for extending the privilege of
parenthood by pure intention to the unmarried. The most promising
avenue to pursue is to attempt to define intent as subsumed within
the concept of functional parenthood that the Principles, E.N.O. and
Rubano advance. If intention can be read as function, then marriage
is arguably as unnecessary to intentional parenthood as it is to
functional parenthood. The emerging doctrine of functional
parenthood lends support to this position. Notably, under the
Principles, the fact that E.N.O. and Rubano had both participated in
planning and preparing for the conception of their children would,
standing alone, be of little significance. For both parenthood by
estoppel and de facto parenthood status, the Principles require the
agreement of a legal parent to allow either co-parenting, 52 or the
formation of a parent-child relationship. 53 Moreover, both statuses
require that the parent have lived with the child.' Before the
conception of a child there is no identifiable legal parent and no
opportunity to live with the child, and so no basis for the recognition
548. See id. at § 2.03(5).
549. See id. at § 2.03(1)(c)(ii).
550. See, e.g., Carolyn Graglia, A Non-Feminist's Perspectives of Mothers and
Homemakers under Chapter 2, 2001 BYU L. REV. 993, 995, 996,1002.
551. Family Resemblance, supra note 95, at 1641; see also Martha Minow, Redefining
Families: Who's in and Who's Out? 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 269, 276-84 (1991) (discussing
problems with the functional approach).
552. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 475, at § 2.03(1)(b)(iii).
553. See id. at § 2.03(1)(c)(ii).
554. See id. at § 2.03(1)(b)(iii) ("since birth"); id. at § 2.03(1)(c)(i) ("for a significant
period of time not less than two years").
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of parenthood by estoppel or of de facto parental rights exists. Thus,
since the Principles do not recognize non-biologically-linked
parentage rights arising solely from events occurring before the birth
of a child, they provide rather infertile ground upon which to extend
the privilege of intentional parenthood to the unmarried.5
Courts have looked at the concept of functional parenthood a
little more expansively than the ALI, and these developments are
supportive of reading intent as function. In particular, the argument
made by Nancy S. that she qualified for de facto parenthood because
she had helped facilitate the conception and birth of the couple's two
children,556 rejected by the court in her case, 57 was compelling to the
court in both E.N.O. and Rubano. In Rubano, this fact solidified
Rubano's status as an adult "involved with paternity of children born
out of wedlock.""55 The court opined:
Allegedly, Rubano was "involved with" the child's paternity in that
DiCenzo's artificial insemination occurred only pursuant to her
"joint decision [with Rubano] to bear a child and to raise said child
together." Moreover, Rubano not only allegedly helped to plan
and arrange for DiCenzo's conception of the child via artificial
insemination from an anonymous donor, she also averred that she
was primarily responsible for the financial costs associated %vith this
procedure."9
In E.N.O., this fact not only bolstered E.N.O.'s claim, but
enabled it to survive in light of a Massachusetts precedent disfavoring
an individual who failed to achieve de facto parenthood status largely
because "he had not been part of the decision to create a family by
bringing the child into the world."6'S In contrast, wrote the court, "the
plaintiff before us was intimately involved in the decision to bring the
child into the world.,
561
555. Parents by pure intention could be deemed legal parents under the Principles if
they were "defined as a parent under other state law." See id. at § 2.03(1)(a). At the
present time, such recognition appears possible only for single women in Arkansas. See
ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201(b)(3), § 9-10-201(c)(1)(C) (Michie 1987).
556. See Nancy S. v. Michele G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212,216 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991)
557. See i&
558. Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959, 971 (R.I. 2000) (quoting R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-
10-3(a) (1956)).
559. Id. at 971.
560. E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 891 (Mass. 1999) (citing C.M. v. P.R., 649
N.E.2d 154, 154 (Mass. 1995)); see also ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE, supra note 4,
at 135 n.46 (commenting that "her role in making conception and birth possible...."
among other things, "may independently be worth protecting").
561. Id.
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It was clear in both E.N. 0. and Rubano that the planning for and
preparation to conceive a child by artificial insemination was very
significant-and in E.N.O. virtually determinative-to convince the
court to bestow functional parenthood status upon the non-biological
mother of the child.62  These cases illustrate that functional
parenthood can encompass the realm of pure intention in which a
child is not yet conceived. At that point in time, the requirement of
an agreement to co-parent by an otherwise legally recognized parent
would not be operative. Indeed, both intending parents would
occupy equivalent legal positions. Naturally, this fact alone does not
answer all of the questions that would be relevant in this context. For
example, the quality of the intention that would carry legal weight
would have to be clarified. In particular, courts would likely demand
that the quality of the intention be at least equivalent to what married
couples are assumed to possess. Significantly, what intentional
parenthood plainly demonstrates that marriage cannot is a dimension
of functional parenthood that the law should demand of all parent-
child relationships. In the unwed-father cases, marriage is said to
guarantee parental functioning.63  But the obligation of spouses
toward children of the marriage is essentially a financial one."
Marital status, by itself, does not require parents to function in other
appropriate ways as parents. By contrast, to clear the hurdle of not
having married his children's mother, an unwed father must show that
he has not only accepted responsibility for his children but that he has
functioned as a parent in other appropriate ways. 65 A functioning
father not only provides financial support for his children but also
"initiates positive, consensual interactions with [his children] on a
regular basis."' ' Since intended parents can make a strong showing
of functioning whether they are married or not, they possess a
promising legal basis for claiming the privilege of parenthood by pure
intention.
The decision of the E.N.O. majority to bestow de facto parental
status on E.N.O. based in part on her having helped plan for the birth
562. Notably, in A.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539 (N.J. 2000), the Court found it irrelevant
to the qualification of the non-biological mother as the children's psychological parent that
she did not participate in the decision to conceive the children. See id. at 545.
563. See, e.g., Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246,256 (1978).
564. See 59 AM. JuR. 2D Parent and Child § 41 (1987); 67A C.J.S. Parent & Child § 49
(1978).
565. See Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 256.
566. Jill Hantley Anderson, The Functioning Father: A Unified Approach to Paternity
Determinations, 30 J. FAM. L. 847,865-67 (1992).
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of her son was not lost on the dissent, which characterized the
majority's reliance on this fact as bordering on the facetious:
[Slurely events occurring during the child's life are more relevant to
the child's well-being than decisions or arrangements concluded
between the mother and her partner before the child's birth. By
giving weight to this factor, the court makes evident that it is not
the child's interests that motivates this decision, but a desire to
acknowledge and give status to the arrangements made between
the plaintiff and the mother before the child was even conceived. 67
The dissent suggested it would be better to grant judicial
recognition to same-sex unions and to regulate E.N.O.'s parentage
claim with that of a divorcing spouse.5 s This approach "would at least
place quite distinct limits, analogous to those now familiar to the law,
on the otherwise utterly amorphous authority the court seems to
bestow today." '569 The dissent appears not to have appreciated that in
the gestational surrogacy context, even where a married couple has
contributed, no genetic material but has arranged for such
contribution through third parties, events that take place before the
child's birth and even before the child's conception are determinative
of the child's legal parentage.570 At first blush, cases like E.N.O. and
Rubano, where one party contributes genetic material and gestates
the child, would appear to bear little resemblance to cases where
married couples resort to gestational surrogacy. Nonetheless, had
E.N.O. and L.M.M and Rubano and DiCenzo elected to pursue
gestational surrogacy instead of artificial insemination, their claim to
parenthood by pure intention would have been no less substantial
than it was in those cases.7 Their claim would be made on the basis
of pure intention, as nothing else about the arrangement, not even
marriage, would operate to secure it.572 Before the conception of the
child, neither spouse is the legal parent. After conception, having
contributed no genetic material, neither has a claim to biological
567. E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 896 (Mass. 1999) (Fried, J., dissenting).
568. See id at 898 (Fried, J., dissenting).
569. Id.
570. See, e.g., Buzzanca v. Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 291 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998)
(holding that "consenting to an act which brings a child into being" determines parentage).
571. See UNIF. PARENTAGE Acr. § 202, 9B U.L.A. 309 (2001) ("A child born to
parents who are not married to each other has the same rights under the law as a child
born to parents who are married to each other."); Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959, 973,
974 (R.I. 2000) (citing Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123 n.3 (1989)) (construing
"unmarried parents" as inclusive of same-sex couples).
572. See O'Hara & Vorzimer, supra note 309, at 37 (remarking that the result in
Buzzanca did not rest on the marital status of the couple).
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parenthood.73 Marriage does nothing to enlarge whatever parentage
claims are held after conception, because no marital presumption or
"child of the marriage" designation would apply on these facts.574
Intention alone qualifies this couple to be considered the child's
parents and, in some jurisdictions, would entitle them to a pre-birth
determination of parentage." In short, investing legal significance in
pre-birth events is at the root of intentional parentage. Parenthood
by intention in this context is equivalent to parenthood by genetics,
gestation or marital presumption. Under the UPA in particular, it is
equivalent to these methods and in no way dependent on them.
As we have seen, intentional parenthood, unlike functional
parenthood, is a type of parenthood that does not depend on the
permission of a legally recognized parent. In fact, intentional
parenthood is a substitute for genetic, gestational or marital-
presumption parenthood. It is used to assign legal parenthood in
derogation of established norms, from the moment of the child's birth
or even before it and is not, as are the ALI's doctrines of parentage
by estoppel and de facto parentage, a theory that allows parenthood
only based on the permission of a parent already legally recognized.
As E.N.O. makes clear, the definition of functional parenthood
encompasses the realm of pure intention in which a child is not yet
conceived. At that point in time, a requirement of an agreement to
co-parent by an otherwise legally recognized parent would be
unnecessary because both intending parents would be in the same
legal position. Their intentions may reflect mere willingness to be a
parent or they may be unambiguous manifestations of their choice
and purposefulness.Y However intention should best be defined, the
law is beginning to recognize that intentions matter. Given that the
marriage of intending parents in no way affects the quality of their
intentions or of their characterization as an aspect of functional
573. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993) (recognizing "genetic
consanguinity and giving birth as means of establishing" parentage).
574. See TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 151.002(a)(1) (Vernon 1996) (providing that the
presumption of paternity attaches when man is married to biological mother when she
gives birth); Doe v. Doe, 710 A.2d 1297, 1316 (Conn. 1998) (defining "child of the
marriage" as limited to a child conceived by both parties, a child adopted by both parties,
a child born to the wife and adopted by the husband, a child conceived by the husband and
adopted by the wife, and a child born to the wife and conceived through artificial
insemination by a donor).
575. See Vorzimer, supra note 309, at 426 ("Parental rights can be finalized [in
California] through a pre-birth judgment process.").
576. See Shultz, supra note 17, at 378.
577. See id. at 310.
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parenthood, the reservation of the privilege of parenthood by pure
intention to the married is unjustified."7
Conclusion
The severance of parenthood into genetic, gestational and
intentional components creates indeterminacy of legal parentage.
Judicial responses to this indeterminacy, concerned with adhering to
the demands of stare decisis, have undertaken a futile search for
bodies of precedent that would lead to reasoned outcomes in all cases
and have reverted to old forms of defining parentage with awkward
results. Legislation, both proposed and enacted, allows married
couples alone to depart from age-old ways of defining parentage and
to expand their families through assisted reproduction via the sole
medium of their intention to rear the resulting child.
With the advent of familial arrangements and of reproductive
technology that well-established methods of determining parentage
address unsatisfactorily, the law has responded by recognizing
functional and intentional parents as parents in some cases. Although
the debate over the legal status of functional parents has not been
without controversy, it can nonetheless inform a theory about who
intentional parents are or should be. To date, intentional parenthood
has been a status accorded only to married couples who are incapable
of bearing children by traditional means. This approach to
intentional parenthood is perpetuated in the revised UPA, leaving
large segments of society, who have important procreative choices to
make, excluded from recognition as intentional parents. Despite calls
to acknowledge and undo this injustice, it will likely continue without
a framework strongly suggesting the need for its reversal.
I have argued that parental intent is in essence an aspect of
parental function supporting recognition of parentage wholly apart
578. California courts are beginning to recognize this simple truth. Same-sex couples in
increasing numbers are obtaining the services of gestational surrogates to gestate pre-
embryos created through the union of a donated egg and sperm and, between the
conception of the child and its birth, are obtaining judicial decrees of parentage naming
both intended parents the parents of the child. See Letter from Andrew W. Vorzimer,
Esq. (on file with author) (June 1, 2001) ("[W]e have been successful in finalizing parental
rights for several dozen same-sex couples. The process allows both individuals to have
their name added to the birth certificate."). As these are instances of parentage by pure
intention without marriage, this type of case suggests that the marriage of the parties in
Buzzanca was in fact irrelevant to its outcome. See O'Hara & Vorzimer, supra note 309,
at 37. Whether a court in California would grant a similar decree to a single person is as
yet unknown. Single women in Arkansas, though, may be entitled to such a decree. See
ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201(b)(3) § 9-10-201(c)(1)(C) (Michie 1987).
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from genetic or gestational contributions or marital presumptions.
Emerging theories of parentage provide a useful background for this
discussion. In particular, the ALI's Principles and recent cases
exploring the applicability of its provisions related to parentage by
estoppel and de facto parentage suggest ways in which the privilege of
parenthood by pure intention might be expanded to allow unmarried
persons and singles also to become parents by intention alone. In this
light, the requirement of marriage under the UPA needs
reconsideration. While the realities of setting policy may have
convinced the drafters of the UPA that it was unenactable without
the exclusionary eligibility criteria s' 9 a more judicious analysis
recognizes that in the context of the creation of children by pure
intention, marriage is not an essential criterion.
579. Uniform Parentage Act (2000) (with Unofficial Annotations by John J. Sampson,
Reporter), 35 Far. L. Q. 81, 171 n. 82 (2001).
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